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Institutional investors exert an important influence in the takeover process. Several 
relationships are identified in this paper. Institutional ownership increases the 
probability of firms becoming takeover targets. The cross-holders’ (institutional 
investors owning shares in both acquirers and targets) shares before takeover bids are 
negatively related to the likelihood of takeover success, offer price and total acquirers’ 
premiums. Institutional investors and cross-holders achieve insignificant positive 
excess returns around the announcement period, compared to heavy loss of total 
acquirer stockholders. Higher excess returns during event window (-1, +1) will raise 
the possibility that acquiring firms becoming new targets in following three years. The 
empirical results are derived from 7300 industry (Business Service Industry) from 1985 
to 2010. 
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I. Introduction 
From the existing literature, we see that takeovers are beneficial for firms being 
acquired, but negative for acquiring firms (see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jovanovic 
and Braguinsky (2002) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988)). Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989) find that target firms’ stockholders on average achieve 30% positive premiums 
in takeovers but for acquiring firms, negative returns are observed in 1980s. Andrade, 
Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) find a negative discount for acquirers’ stock price but a 3 
to 4 percent premium on target stock price. Bugeja and Walter (1995) find that 
takeovers create value for targets because of the removal of inefficient target 
management and a reduction of agency costs. Chatterjee (1992) shows that 
restructuring is the motive behind a takeover and creates value for the target firms. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that bidder’s CEO will overpay for target firms and 
make value-damaging mergers due to overconfidence. 
On the other side, the hypothesis that all the investors are rational and seek to earn 
maximum profit, is still widely accepted, although Shleifer and Vishny (2003) have 
assumed the investors are irrational. Thus, there should be a reason for acquirers’ 
stockholders to vote for these negative takeover decisions. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) 
showed that despite suffering heavy losses in takeover period, acquiring firms’ 
shareholders prefer to vote for the mergers when cross-ownership exists in both bidders 
and targets. Institutional investors’ cross-ownership is defined as the institutions’ 
investment in both takeover acquirers and targets. In this situation, the bidders’ negative 
return can be compensated by the positive premium from the stake they hold in target 
firms, sometimes even earning a significant profit. A specific example of Microsoft and 
Yahoo is shown in Appendix.  
In this paper, we will follow Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008), using the sample 
containing all takeovers in SIC 7300 industry from 1985 to 2010. 
All the firms in the research sample are in only one industry, SIC 7300. According 
to United States Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), 7300 industry mainly includes 
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the firms that render business services on a contract or fee basis, such as prepackaged 
software (operating, utility, and applications programs as important products) and 
advertising services1. Numerous famous companies (such as Microsoft, Yahoo and 
Ebay) exist in this industry and have substantial revenues in U.S. market. Howe’s (1986) 
evidence shows that the employment rate in Business Services Industry (SIC 7300 
industry) experienced a rapid growth during the 1980s, especially in computer and data 
processing services (by more than 250%). Mowery (1995) states that prepackaged 
software accounts for 70% revenue in the industry in 1992. Based on these data, we can 
find that SIC 7300 industry can be a large and emerging industry with high revenue. In 
this kind of industry, it is possible that more takeovers can be observed. 
By concentrating only on Business Service Industry, we can control some factors 
that may vary significantly between different industries. There may be many different 
motivations for takeover, for example, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) distinguish 
the motives into three categories, synergy, agency and hubris. Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) state that CEO overconfidence will lead to higher possibility of making takeover 
decision. By focusing only on one industry, we may exclude the factors that differ by 
industry and may control the takeover motivations. An additional benefit to study this 
industry is that many observations and takeovers exist in this industry from 1985 to 
2010, much more than in other industries (see appendix table 30).  
The companies in this industry regularly have large proportion of intangible assets 
to their total assets and high level of research & development expenses. Accordingly, 
in the Business Services Industry, which is highly reliant on new technologies and 
services, we would expect to see more mergers and acquisitions with the intent of 
acquiring new technologies, enhancing market share and reducing competition. In 
contrast, due to the high concentration of market share in a relatively small number of 
firms, antitrust laws are  are influential in some historical case of horizontal takeovers.  
With the objective of exploring the other effects of institutional investors’ cross-
                         
1  The details of SIC 7300 industry can be found on the website of United States Department of Labor. 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sicsearch.html?p_sic=73&p_search= 
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holding in the whole takeover process, some questions are put forward first and the 
answers will be developed as hypotheses in later part. For the firms in 7300 industry, 
are the institutional holdings a critical factor that makes them become a takeover target? 
Is it probable that the cross-holders’ shares in target firms and acquiring firms before 
takeover can impact the success of takeover bid? How the cross-ownership will 
influence the offer price? Could institutional investors with cross-ownership achieve a 
different return around bid announcement day? How is the takeover premium  affected 
by the cross-ownership? What’s the relation between return to cross-ownership and 
firm performance? What kind of acquiring firms will become targets in new takeovers 
after the previous one? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the hypotheses 
and reviews the related literature. Section III describes the two samples used, total 
sample and takeover sample, and presents their descriptive statistics. Section IV denotes 
the empirical tests, including the regression models, the variable characteristics for 
regression procedures, the robustness test if available, and the empirical results for each 
corresponding procedure. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Hypothesis development and related literature 
H1: For all the firms in the 7300 industry, the institutional holding increases the 
probability of becoming takeover target, but the effects are different for horizontal and 
non-horizontal takeovers. The firms with higher shareholdings by institutions are 
expected to be more likely to attract horizontal acquirers. We can attribute this 
phenomenon to institutions’ better communication with corporate management and 
their role as corporate monitor. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find the greater size of 
ownership they hold in investee, the stronger incentive the institutions have to monitor 
the management. Since horizontal bidders pay more attention on the post-takeover 
benefits, such as reducing competition, increasing productive efficiency and enhancing 
buying power, they need more institutions’ monitor on wealth protection, corporate 
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management, agency problem and decision making.  
Fee and Thomas (2004) show that horizontal mergers do not raise monopolistic 
collusion, but increase productive efficiency and buying power. Hannan and Rhoades 
(1987) show that higher market share and a lower capital-to-asset ratio will lead to 
higher possibility of being acquired by non-horizontal bidders in the banking industry. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) believe that shareholders having block shares will be more 
effective monitors of the management. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) find that firms with 
lower levels of institutional investment tend to adopt more value-reducing antitakeover 
charter amendments. Romano (2001) finds out that in the 1990s, institutional investors 
improved corporate performance and eliminated takeover defenses. Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992) show that if there’s significant net change in institutional holdings, 
the probability of receiving a takeover bid will decrease. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) 
suggest that institutional investors can be good monitors for other shareholders’ wealth, 
a similar point to Hart (1995). Consequently, the existence of institutional ownership 
in 7300 industry firms may be attractive for horizontal acquirers. 
H2: For all the public takeovers in 7300 industry, the institutions’ stake will 
positively affect the probability of takeover success. In contrast, the institutional cross- 
ownership in acquirers and targets may have indeterminate influence on the possibility 
of completion. Some previous studies have found positive relationship between the 
chance of takeover success and toehold size (pre-bid ownership by bidders). Betton and 
Eckbo (2000) find that a larger bidder toehold can decrease competition and remove 
certain target defenses. Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) make the statement that 
buying some small part of targets before making takeover announcement can yield a 
competitive advantage when multiple bidders are present, based on auction theory. 
Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) show that owning part of the target before 
takeover can help bidders win the auction. However, Bris (2001) takes the position that 
the bidders’ pre-takeover trades may be hidden by market liquidity, and thus the 
takeover probabilities are contingent on whether the trades are disclosed or not by the 
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market. In this paper, the shares of cross-holders (the institutional investors owning 
stock shares in both target and bidder) are studied. The cross-holders’ shares in target 
firms are similar to toeholds. Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between 
the probability of takeover success and toehold size can be applied to the probability of 
takeover success and cross-ownership as well. 
H3: The institutional cross-owners’ share in both firms (bidder and target) before 
bidding should have a negative effect on the offer price. The acquirers who have a 
higher level of ownership in the target firms, could offer higher consideration for the 
takeover. This hypothesis is made on the insider basis, namely, assuming that if the 
institutional investor are cross-owners, they will know more clearly about the intrinsic 
value of the target firms. Singh (1998) concludes that bidders with a toehold are more 
likely to bid above firms’ real valuation in order to extract greater surplus from other 
bidding rivals. On the contrary, Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) show the 
empirical results that owning part of the targets before takeover can help bidders win 
the auction, often with a lower offer. Betton and Eckbo (2000) also find evidence that 
the expected payoff is decreasing with higher toehold, consistent with Bris (2001). Thus, 
we hypothesize that the effect of cross-holders’ ownership in target firms can be similar 
with toeholds, reducing the offer price. Similarly with the hypothesis 2, we hypothesize 
that the negative relationship between the offer price and toehold size can be applied to 
the offer price and cross-ownership as well. 
  When we only consider the institutional shares in the two firms before takeover, we 
will expect them to have a crucial effect in limiting the offer price to a reasonable level. 
Hart (1995) supports the idea that institutional investor will put a person in the 
management, a person who will diminish agency problems and serve for the institutions’ 
benefit instead of pursuing his own goals, like extracting value from a takeover event. 
H4: From former studies, takeovers are beneficial for firms being acquired, but 
negative for acquiring firms (see Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and 
Netter (1988)). Jarrell, Annette and Poulsen (1989) even find that target firms’ 
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stockholders, on average, achieve 30% positive premiums in takeovers but for acquiring 
firms, negative returns are observed in 1980s. Therefore, we can conclude that bidders 
lose in takeover activities generally. Nevertheless, Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) obtain 
empirical results showing that the positive returns of substantial stakes held by 
acquiring firms in the targets compensate the loss in acquirers’ shares. In addition, 
Betton and Eckbo (2000) find that greater toehold is associated with lower biding 
premiums and lower level of stock price runups before acquisition announcement. We, 
therefore, hypothesize that the takeover announcement period return will be negative 
for the acquiring firms, but not significant or even positive for the cross-owners. The 
gains to cross-holders are determined by adding up total dollar returns in both acquirers 
and targets divided by the total dollar value held by the institutional cross-owners.  
H5: We expect a higher level of ownership in targets held by cross-holders and an 
increase in institutional shares to be negatively related to takeover premiums. Stulz, 
Walkling and Song (1990) show a negative correlation between successful takeover 
gains and institutional holdings. Goldman and Qian (2005) state that when a high level 
of toehold exists, the after event agency problem may be serious due to enhanced 
managerial entrenchment and lower firm value, the problem which could probably 
drive down the premiums. Bris (2001) also shows a negative relation between toehold 
size and takeover premiums. Compared to this idea, Betton and Eckbo (2000) find that 
toehold purchases will lead to target stock price runups before takeover announcement 
and then pull up the total takeover costs (markup pricings). 
  H6: The higher takeover premiums earned by acquirers, the better post-takeover 
performance (such as higher market-to-book ratio) they will have. This phenomenon 
may be attributed to synergy. Better mergers and acquisitions with higher takeover 
premiums can be attributed to synergy, which will increase the efficiency of the new 
consolidated corporation and make the best use of the resources. Based on Hypothesis 
5, it can be hypothesized that higher premiums are derived from lower cross-ownership, 
which reduces the post-takeover managerial entrenchment and increases firm value, 
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based on Goldman and Qian’s (2005) conclusion. In addition, Jensen (1986) puts 
forward the theory, agency cost of free cash flow, that takeover is the only effective 
way to change control in the firms whose managements do not maximize value. Thus, 
if a bad management has been taken over, a positive gain and better follow-up 
performance will be expected. 
H7: The bidders gain significant negative abnormal returns around announcement 
period will become new takeover targets in the following three years. Mitchell and Lehn 
(1990) offer empirical results that one motive for takeover is to drive out firms that 
previously made value-damaging acquisitions. Jensen (1986) argues that takeover is the 
only effective way to remove the agency problem produced by free cash flow. It is 
rational to predict that bidders gained low excess returns or lost heavily in previous bid 
activity will become a target in later new takeovers. 
 
III. Sample description 
Two samples are employed for later empirical tests, full sample and takeover 
sample. The full sample includes all the public firms in Business Service Industry from 
1985-2010, reported in COMPUSTAT database with SIC code 7300. After that, a 
subsample (takeover sample) is used, containing all the companies in SIC 7300 industry 
that become takeover targets from 1985-2010, takeover data reported in Thomson 
Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) merger databases. The acquirers for these takeovers are 
all U.S. public firms with daily price data and fundamental data available on Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and COMPUSTAT database.  
In the first step, 26595 observations in the initial full sample and 748 takeovers in 
the takeover subsample are found.  
For the later part regression stage, the institutional stake in each acquiring firms 
and target firms are needed. The Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) 
Holdings database provides the exact ownership data of each institutional investor in 
targets and acquirers and this data is used to calculate the cross-ownership. The 
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institutional ownership data is reported quarterly at every March 31th, June 30th, 
September 30th and December 31th.  
Hence, when testing the relationship between institutional ownership and the 
probability of receiving a takeover bid (empirical test 1) based on the full sample, we 
use the data reported on December 31th of year (t-1) as institution ownership data for 
each firms in year t. Unfortunately, only 10857 observations in full sample have the 
institutional ownership data available on December 31th in year (t-1).  
In the later section, when computing the cross-ownership for the firms in takeover 
sample, we use the latest report data before takeover to get the cross-holdings. For 
example, if the takeover announcement is on April 17th of year t, the reported 
institutional share data on March 31th of year t is used. Only 660 pairs of firms in 
takeover sample have the data available.  
To find out whether these two incomplete samples can represent the initial one, 
the following statistical table1 are utilized. 
For the takeover sample, the percentage of completed takeovers, defenses adopted 
takeovers, bid auction takeovers, horizontal takeovers and cash paid takeovers to total 
takeovers are similar for the initial sample and final sample. For the full sample, no 
significant difference is observed for the logarithm of firms’ average market value and 
leverage. However, the proportion of intangible assets to total assets and logarithm 
value of market share are significantly different between the sample used in this paper 
and the original sample. 
We then use the latter two samples (containing 660 takeovers and 10857 firm 
observations) as proxies. If we focus on solving this problem in the future, hand-
collecting institutional ownership data from the firms’ proxy statement will work.  
For the final sample, 10857 observations with obtainable institutional share data 
are included. From 1985 to 2010, 660 takeovers take place, of which 452 are horizontal 
takeovers and 208 are held by bidders from another industry. Of these 660 takeovers, 
553 are successful mergers and 100% shares are owned by the acquirers after takeover  
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Table1 Comparison of initial sample and final sample  
Market share is specific firms' sales divided by total industry sales in the corresponding year. Leverage is the 
ratio of total liability to total assets. Log size stands for the logarithm of bidders' market value. Takeover status 
indicates whether the former takeover bids succeed or not. Defense is the presence of antitakeover measures used 
in former takeover. Multiple bidder is the indicator of whether multiple bidders exist in former takeover. 
Horizontal is the binary variable if acquiring firms also belong to 7300 industry. Medium indicates whether cash 
employed or not in former takeover bid. Defense refers to the adoption of takeover defenses. *Significant at 
10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1% 
Panel A. Takeover sample 
  N=748(initial)     N=660(final) 
  Indicator=1 Percent Total      Indicator=1 Percent Total  
Takeover status 611 81.68  748     553 83.79  660 
Defense 103 13.77  748     99 15.00  660 
Multiple bidders 33 4.41  748     32 4.85  660 
Horizontal 492 65.78  748     452 68.48  660 
Medium 251 33.56  748     228 34.55  660 
Panel B. Full sample   
  N=26595(initial)   N= 10857(final)   
  mean median Std. Dev   mean median Std. Dev t value 
Log (market value) 18.17  18.16  2.66    19.18  19.06  2.02  1.23  
Intangible/total asset 0.18  0.08  0.21    0.16  0.08  0.19  5.22*** 
Log (market share) -9.65  -9.51  2.48    -8.64  -8.75  1.97  2.01* 
Leverage 0.66  0.48  0.87    0.71  0.40  14.10  0.75  
 
activity, while 107 takeovers fail at last. From table 2, it can be observed that horizontal 
takeovers are more prevalent in this industry during 1985 to 2010, about two times of 
the non-horizontal takeovers. And most part of the bids turn out to be accepted by the 
targets finally. Only one fifth of the takeovers are incomplete. The takeover results 
(success or failure) are uniformly distributed when analyzing two parts, horizontal and 
non-horizontal takeovers separately. When focusing on ratio of takeovers to the total 
number of firms existing each year, we can point out that only a tiny fraction of firms 
(5.5% on average for each year) become targets in this industry. 
From the table 30 in the appendix, as we discussed before, we can find that 7300 
industry has the most observations in firms’ number. Therefore, this industry is selected 
to study in.  
From 1998 to 2001, a larger fraction of firms become takeover targets, ranging from 
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Table2  Annual number of firms with horizontal mergers, successful takeovers and no takeover in 7300 industry 
Horizontal takeovers refer to the firms who receive takeover bid from acquirers also in the 7300 industry and they are divided into two categories, successful and 
unsuccessful. Non-horizontal takeovers represent the firms receive takeover bid from companies belonging to other industry, classified as successful and unsuccessful 
as well. Total takeovers sum up both the horizontal takeovers and non-horizontal takeovers. No takeover refers to the rest firms that receive no bid in 7300 industry. 
Percent of horizontal to total takeovers is computed as the number of total takeovers divided by the horizontal takeovers. Percent of targets to total firms is computed 
as the total takeovers divided by total sample. Total sample refers to the total number of firms that have institutional shares data available on the Thomson Financial 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings database. The takeover data is from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) merger databases. 
    Horizontal takeovers   Non-horizontal takeovers       Percent of 
horizontal to total 
takeovers (%) 
Percent of 











1985   1 0 1   3 0 3   4 175 25.0  2.2  179 
1986   2 0 2   4 1 5   7 187 28.6  3.6  194 
1987   6 2 8   2 0 2   10 191 80.0  5.0  201 
1988   3 3 6   4 2 6   12 206 50.0  5.5  218 
1989   3 4 7   6 1 7   14 201 50.0  6.5  215 
1990   6 2 8   5 2 7   15 197 53.3  7.1  212 
1991   5 1 6   2 1 3   9 195 66.7  4.4  204 
1992   2 1 3   1 0 1   4 206 75.0  1.9  210 
1993   3 2 5   2 0 2   7 224 71.4  3.0  231 
1994   6 3 9   3 2 5   14 258 64.3  5.1  272 
1995   12 2 14   6 2 8   22 289 63.6  7.1  311 
1996   14 2 16   8 1 9   25 354 64.0  6.6  379 
1997   23 0 23   12 0 12   35 474 65.7  6.9  509 
1998   32 4 36   11 1 12   48 525 75.0  8.4  573 
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1999   37 8 45   12 3 15   60 521 75.0  10.3  581 
2000   35 8 43   11 1 12   55 672 78.2  7.6  727 
2001   39 6 45   16 2 18   63 691 71.4  8.4  754 
2002   25 2 27   7 3 10   37 635 73.0  5.5  672 
2003   25 1 26   7 1 8   34 583 76.5  5.5  617 
2004   15 2 17   9 3 12   29 528 58.6  5.2  557 
2005   20 2 22   10 0 10   32 514 68.8  5.9  546 
2006   13 2 15   11 2 13   28 517 53.6  5.1  545 
2007   16 4 20   8 1 9   29 487 69.0  5.6  516 
2008   15 6 21   4 1 5   26 482 80.8  5.1  508 
2009   8 4 12   5 2 7   19 454 63.2  4.0  473 
2010   11 4 15   7 0 7   22 431 68.2  4.9  453 
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Table3 Wald and LR tests for combining outcomes 
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts related to give pair of outcomes are 0 (categories are indistinguishable). 
The likelihood of being a target has been divided into five categories. Category 1 refers to the horizontal 
successful takeovers, while category 2 is non-horizontal successful takeovers. Category 3 represents 
horizontal unsuccessful takeovers and Category 4 is non-horizontal unsuccessful takeovers. The last category 
refers to firms don't receive any takeover bid in the given year. The column (1), (2) and (3) are derived when 
ROA, ROE and market-to-book ratio are independent variables respectively. Chi-square is also shown. 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
Panel A. Wald combine test 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Categories tested chi-square   Categories tested chi-square   Categories tested chi-square 
1 2 34.09    1 2 34.08    1 2 34.08  
1 3 45.38**   1 3 44.89**   1 3 45.08** 
1 4 24.27    1 4 24.39    1 4 24.46  
1 5 127.1***   1 5 127.09***   1 5 127.1*** 
2 3 24.51    2 3 24.23    2 3 24.31  
2 4 9.06    2 4 9.02    2 4 9.08  
2 5 32.31    2 5 32.30    2 5 32.27  
3 4 16.79    3 4 16.35    3 4 16.33  
3 5 30.10    3 5 29.49    3 5 29.68  
4 5 11.90    4 5 11.89    4 5 11.94  
Panel B. Likelihood ratio combine test 
1 2 35.75    1 2 35.75    1 2 35.78  
1 3 58.4***   1 3 57.95***   1 3 58.13*** 
1 4 34.29    1 4 34.28    1 4 34.34  
1 5 149.8***   1 5 149.79***   1 5 149.8*** 
2 3 40.94    2 3 40.67    2 3 40.84  
2 4 23.17    2 4 23.14    2 4 23.23  
2 5 35.80    2 5 35.78    2 5 35.81  
3 4 28.34    3 4 28.07    3 4 28.06  
3 5 48.8**   3 5 48.18**   3 5 48.36** 
4 5 28.64    4 5 28.63    4 5 28.68  
 
7.6% to 10.3% of the total firms in each year. These years are at the end of the fifth 
merger wave, during which many cross-border takeovers appeared. According to Black 
(1999), so many mergers and acquisitions occurred in the late 1990s due to the 
favorable political climate. The increasing proportion of takeovers could be attributed 
to the fifth merger wave but the wave ends due to the economic recession. 
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IV. Empirical tests  
1. Institutional ownership’s effect on attracting a bidder  
1.1 The estimation procedure 
This estimation step is employed mainly to test whether the results in 7300 
industry are consistent with extant literature which finds that the level of institutional 
ownership in a firm will positively affect the probability of attracting a takeover 
acquirer. But in this paper, we consider the further study of the industry the acquirers 
belong to, horizontal (from 7300 industry as well) acquirers or the rest, as some control 
variables are added indicating whether the bidders are inside or outside the industry. 
Next, whether the ultimate takeovers succeed will also be tested as a possibility. Finally, 
we can also find which explanatory variables may take on significant value during 
different time period from 1985 to 2010. Correspondingly, to reach the task, a 
multinomial logit regression process will be employed accounting for the following five 
mutually exclusive conditions for each observation in 7300 industry: (1) it attracts 
bidders that come from the same industry and successful complete the takeover; (2) it 
attracts bidders that come from the same industry but ultimately fail; (3) it attracts 
bidders that are from non-horizontal industry and succeeds; (4) it attracts bidders that 
are from non-horizontal industry and fail at last or (5) it attracts no bidder. 
This multinomial logit model is similar to the one Hannan and Rhoades (1987) 
used, describing the relation between the probability of any outcome occur during each 
given year t and the institutional ownership, as well as some other control variables.  
The multinomial logit model employs the method of maximum likelihood, 
choosing the values that maximize the likelihood function. And this model has the 
assumptions of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This assumption states 
that the odds of preferring one class over another do not depend on the presence or 
absence of other "irrelevant" alternatives. That means, if a new distinct alternative event 
appears, the probability of the other event’s occurrence will not change or will not be 
affected by the new added event. This assumption will be tested in the following part. 
As the multinomial logit regression model is employed in this section, whether 
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any two different outcomes of the dependent variable should be combined, must be 
tested. According to Long and Freese (2006), if none of the independent variable has a 
significant impact on the odds of the dependent variable’s outcome M versus outcome 
N, we can conclude that M and N are indistinguishable with respect to the variables in 
the model. If outcomes M and N are proved to be indistinguishable, it is more proper 
to combine them. To test whether the five categories of dependent variable (the 
likelihood of being taken over) are indistinguishable or not, a Wald test and a 
Likelihood ratio test are employed. In the table 3, the Wald combining test and 
Likelihood ratio test results are shown. These two tests focus on the relationships 
between each two categories and give similar results. 
The table 3 shows that only the differences among category 1 (horizontal 
successful takeovers), 3 (horizontal unsuccessful takeovers) and 5 (no takeover) are 
significant, that means the other two categories, non-horizontal successful takeovers 
and non-horizontal unsuccessful takeovers, can be combined to any other categories 
due to the insignificant distinction. Accordingly, only three categories of dependent 
variables remain: successful takeovers, unsuccessful takeovers and no takeover. 
Based on this testing results, a logit model with dependent variable only classified 
into three categories are used (successful, unsuccessful and no takeover) initially. 
However, some of the independent variables, that are important explanatory variables 
for takeover motivations in 7300 industry and that are designed to be industry specific, 
such as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, the market share, the growth rate 
and the leverage, are meaningless. With the intent to find out more specific information 
of the industry effect, the dependent variable classified into five mutually exclusive 
events is employed finally, horizontal successful takeovers, horizontal unsuccessful 
takeovers, non-horizontal successful takeovers, non-horizontal takeovers and no 
takeover. 
The model is expressed as  
P HS(t)/ P NT(t) = exp (X’t βHS),                                     (1) 
P HU(t)/ P NT(t) = exp (X’t βHU),                                     (2) 
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P NS(t)/ P NT(t) = exp (X’t βNS),                                     (3) 
P NU(t)/ P NT(t) = exp (X’t βNU),                                     (4) 
Where P HS(t), P HU(t), P NS(t) and P NU(t) denote the probability of the firms’ being 
acquired by horizontal bidders successfully, being acquired by horizontal bidders 
unsuccessfully, being acquired by non-horizontal bidders successfully, and being 
acquired by non-horizontal bidders unsuccessfully2. P NT(t) represent the likelihood 
that no takeover occur for this firm during the year t, and it’s set to be reference category 
when running the multinomial logit regression. X’t denotes a vector of independent 
variables that may affect the dependent variable. βNU stands for a vector of regression 
procedures’ coefficients. 
1.2 Variable design and statistics  
Table4 gives the descriptive statistics for the regression variables. Panel A shows 
the same takeover numbers with Table2 and Panel B is the statistics for the explanatory 
variables. All the variables are lagged for one year (except the pre-takeover market-to-
book ratio, calculated as the three year average before takeover), as this may be the 
rational length of time period for independent variables’ effects on dependent variable. 
The takeover data is derived from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers & 
Acquisitions database. The institutional shares data is from Thomson Financial SDC 
Platinum (SDC) merger database and the other fundamental data is from 
COMPUSTAT database. 
To test hypothesis 1, whether the institutional holdings increase the likelihood of 
attracting takeover bid, and the different effects of horizontal and non-horizontal 
acquirers, dependent variable is used to indicate the 5 categories of firms’ conditions. 
It obtain a value of 1 when firms attract horizontal bids and accept, a value of 2 when 
firms get horizontal bids and fail, a value of 3 when firms get non-horizontal bids and 
success, a value of 4 when firms get non-horizontal bids and fail, and a value of 5 when  
                         
2 These relations can be expressed more generally as 
Pj(t) = exp (Xt β𝑗) / ∑ exp (Xt β𝑘)5𝑘=1  
Where Pj(t) denotes the probability that the observed firms will fall into category j of five categories during year t. 
Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) can be derived after the normalization by transforming the four categories’ coefficients 
correlated with the fifth alternatives, referring to Greene (2008) p842.   
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Table4  Summary statistics of regression variables 
Dependent variable is defined as the probability of each of the following five events occurring during 
any given year t: (1) the firm attracts bidders that come from the some industry and successful 
complete the takeover, (2) the firm attracts bidders that come from the some industry but fail at last, 
(3) the firm attracts bidders that are from non-horizontal industry and success, (4) the firm attracts 
bidders that are from non-horizontal industry and fail at last or (5) the firm attracts no bidder. Instown 
is the institutional ownership in each firm, using the last December 31th data before the year t, 
reported on Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings database. Intangible 
assets proportion refers to the ratio of intangible assets to total assets during the year previous to t. 
ROA and ROE refers to the net income on total assets and equity during the year previous to t, 
respectively. RELROA (RELROE) refers to ROA (ROE) divided by the average industry ROA 
(ROE) during the year previous to t. Pre-takeover MB ration is computed as the average book-to-
market ratio during the three years previous to t. Log (size) is the logarithm of market capitalization. 
Log (market share) represents the sales divided by the industry total sales during the year previous to 
t. Growth opportunity is calculated as the research & development expenses divided by the sales 
during the year previous to year t. Leverage is data during the year previous to year t. The year 
indicates the year the firms is observed to be acquired or not to be acquired. 




Percent of sample 
(%) Total sample 
Horizontal takeover 452 4.16  10857 
       Successful takeover 377 3.47  10857 
       Unsuccessful takeover 75 0.69  10857 
Non-horizontal takeover 208 1.92  10857 
       Successful takeover 176 1.62  10857 
       Unsuccessful takeover 32 0.29  10857 
No takeover 10197 93.92  10857 
Panel B. Independent variables (year dummy excluded) 
  Mean Median Std. Dev 
Instown 0.331  0.259  0.291  
Intangible assets proportion 0.164  0.085  0.191  
ROA -0.340  0.024  14.633  
Relative ROA 0.184  -0.012  2.745  
ROE -0.213  0.058  10.172  
Relative ROE -0.200  -0.020  59.459  
Pre-takeover MB ratio 9.682  2.265  136.379  
Market cap 2.449E9 1.899E8 1.625E10 
Log (size) 19.176  19.062  2.018  
Log (Market share) -8.644  -8.750  1.971  
Growth rate 0.849  0.083  28.148  
Leverage 0.707  0.404  14.096  
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firms attract no takeover in given year t.  
The shares held by institutional investors in each firm are utilized as major 
independent variable. The institutional shares data are collected from Thomson 
Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) merger databases. It can be found that on average, 
institutions own 33.1% shares of all the firms in Business Service Industry, with a 
median of 25.9%. That means, for each public traded firm in 7300 industry, one third 
of the shares are controlled by institutional investors.  
Other control variables are employed as well. As the total sample includes the 
firms from service industry, the intangible assets and research & development expenses 
will be important factors to be taken into account when acquirers make a takeover bid. 
In this model, the ratio of intangible assets to the total assets and research & 
development expenses to the sales (defined as growth rate) are added as control 
variables. These two variables can be designed to be horizontal indicator, as they are 
the major value source for horizontal takeovers and can be predicted to be positively 
related to the possibility of horizontal takeover. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) show 
that the level of tangible assets will raise the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid. Hall 
(1992) claims that intangible resources can play a major role when developing 
management strategies. Hence, the fraction of intangible assets and the growth rate are 
employed here to explain the probability of attracting takeover bids. For the companies 
in 7300 industry, 16.4% of their total assets consist of intangible assets and  research 
& development expenses make up 84.9% of their sales, on average.  
Pre-takeover ROA, ROE and market-to-book ratio (defined as market value of 
total assets divided by book value of total assets) are utilized as a proxy for performance. 
Relative ROA and relative ROE, calculated by sample firms’ ROA or ROE divided by 
the industry average ROA or ROE, are employed as well. Former studies have found  
that one incentive for takeovers is to drive out bad management suggesting that firms 
with lower performance ratios will become takeover targets. However, Hannan and 
Rhoades (1987) find no significant impact of the pre-takeover performance on receiving 
a takeover bid later, even when they use the relative ROA and relative ROE. Jensen 
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(1986) holds the view that takeover is the only effective way to drive out badly 
performing management.  
   The logarithm of firm market capitalization is used to indicate the firms’ size effect 
in the takeover process. As in previous research in U.S. market, larger bidders tend to 
acquire smaller targets. Palepu (1986) finds an inverse relationship between firm size 
and takeover probability, using net book asset value as the proxy for size. In this sample, 
the 10857 firms have an average market capitalization of 2448.67 million and a mean 
capitalization of 189.94 million, with the mean and median logarithm of 19.176 and 
19.602. 
   Market share is computed as each firm’s sales divided by the 7300 industry total 
sales in the same year. Contingent on this variable, we can determine the firms’ position 
in the Business Service Industry. As Bextor (1985) states, a larger position in the market 
will, to some extent, promise a long run existence. Thus, a positive effect of market 
share on takeover possibility can be predicted for the non-horizontal takeovers. In 
contrast, as the antitrust laws have been enforced for many cases in this industry, the 
higher market share may lead to a negative motives for horizontal acquirers to announce 
a bid. Therefore, market share can be used to indicate the acquirers from horizontal or 
non-horizontal industry. In this sample, the firms have a mean (median) value of market 
share at 0.185% (0.016%), which is really a trivial number. We then transformed this 
variable into a logarithm as well. 
    Leverage shows the financial structure in each firms and is derived from total 
liabilities divided by total assets. It has an average value of 0.707 and a median of 0.404. 
1.3 Empirical results 
Table5 gives the results for the multinomial logit procedure. Three estimation 
processes are employed as the table 4 displaying, using ROA, ROE and market-to-book 
ratio as the control variables. Each regression procedure produces four coefficient 
vectors, respectively referring to horizontal successful takeovers, horizontal 
unsuccessful takeovers, non-horizontal successful takeovers and non-horizontal 
unsuccessful takeovers.  
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    For the major independent variable, institutions’ shareholdings play a positive role 
in attracting bidders and increasing the likelihood of takeover success, for both 
horizontal and non-horizontal takeovers (significant at the 1% level). This result 
supports the former conclusion that institutions can monitor the investee and remove 
value-damaging anti-takeover defenses, thereby, increasing the probability of a firm 
being acquired. What’s more, in this part, we also find evidence that institutions’ 
holdings have a significant positive impact on the likelihood of a bid’s success.  
    When it comes to the control variables, several results can be observed. The 
fraction of intangible assets in total assets is a significant factor for horizontal takeover 
success. However, less intangible assets proportion for a firms in Business Service 
Industry will be more attractive for acquirers in the same industry to hold a successful 
takeover. Since the intangible assets can be the main factor for acquirers’ management 
to make the takeover decisions, for the competitiveness, productive efficiency and 
bargaining power, when a takeover bid is offered by horizontal firms, the target is more 
willing to accept in order to offset the poor condition of intangible assets. 
It can be seen that the size effect on the likelihood of becoming target is consistent 
with Palepu (1986), that smaller firms are more likely to receive tender offer. There’s 
a significant adverse relationship between logarithm of size and the probability of 
attracting a bid. The firms with a smaller market capitalization will be more likely to 
be offered a takeover bid no matter whether the bidders are from the same industry or 
not. But for the non-horizontal bidders, the takeovers are more likely to be successful. 
This result may be explained by the consolidation costs after takeover and the existence 
of antitrust laws for horizontal acquisitions. It will be costly to consolidate two entities 
to a new one after completed takeover, since the two entities may possess quite different 
technologies, resources, operating strategies and the like before consolidation. 
Therefore, they will benefit a lot from a smaller target, which leads to a quick alignment. 
In addition, due to the antitrust laws, if two big firms both from 7300 industry merge, 
they tend to make up a relatively large market share, which is likely to face an antitrust 
challenge. For an outside industry acquirer, a smaller firm can also be a better choice 
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to reduce post-merger cost. Fortunately, no antitrust laws existing, non-horizontal 
takeovers are more likely to turn out to be successful. 
   Market share, however, gives us an interesting result. We can observe that only in 
unsuccessful horizontal takeovers, does market share show a positive impact. For this 
result, we may try to give a reason that for enhancing market power, reducing 
competiveness and adding products’ selling price, the firms in 7300 industry show more 
interest in other firms having large market share also in this industry but get an 
unwanted results at last. Although acquiring firms in Business Service Industry are 
willing to merge with other large-market-share firms, but they may not able to afford a 
satisfactory offer price because of the target’s relative large market share. 
   Leverage turns out to be another indicator for the bidders’ industry. It only has a 
significant negative effect on horizontal takeover probability. As a member in Business 
Service Industry, the intangible assets, like technologies patent and goodwill, are really 
critical factors to live on. Too much leverage may limit the resources available to 
develop intangible assets and increase the financial risk and bankruptcy possibility for 
the firm, which may not be beneficial for long run operations. Based on this 
consideration, horizontal acquirers are more likely to choose the lower leveraged targets. 
However, when considering the whole market, the leverage ratio may not be an 
important element for other industries and areas, so that it shows insignificant relation 
with the non-horizontal takeovers’ appearance frequency.  
  Finally, the time dummies’ results are shown in the table 6. This table is the omitted 
part of table5 column (1). Only this part is shown in table6 because the other two 
columns represent similar regression results. This variable displays the level of takeover 
possibility in each given year. Only for the horizontal successful takeovers this variable 
gives positive impact. We can find that in 1999, time dummy shows the most 
significance at the 1% level for the horizontal successful takeovers, as this event 
accounts for 6.37% of all the mutually exclusive events (horizontal success, horizontal 
incompletion, non-horizontal success, non-horizontal incompletion, no takeover) in 
that year, largest percentages of each year. And for the other year with high probability 
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Table5 What makes the firm to be a takeover target in the whole 7300 industry 
Dependent variable is defined as the probability of each of the following five events occurring during any given year t: (1) the firm attracts bidders that come from the some industry 
and successful complete the takeover, (2) the firm attracts bidders that come from the some industry but fail at last, (3) the firm attracts bidders that are from non-horizontal industry 
and success, (4) the firm attracts bidders that are from non-horizontal industry and fail at last or (5) the firm attracts no bidder. Instown is the institutional ownership in each firm, 
using the last December 31th data before the year t, reported on Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings database. Intangible assets proportion refers to the 
ratio of intangible assets to total assets during the year previous to t. ROA and ROE refers to the net income on total assets and equity during the year previous to t, respectively. MB 
is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio before takeover. Log (size) is the logarithm of market capitalization. Log (market share) represents the sales divided by the industry 
total sales during the year previous to t. Growth opportunity is calculated as the research & development expenses divided by the sales during the year previous to year t. Leverage is 
data during the year previous to year t. The year t indicates the year the firms is observed to be acquired or not to be acquired. Time dummies are omitted and will be displayed in 
following table. LR denotes to likelihood ratio for the total logistic model. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Wald Chi-Square value are shown in 
parentheses. 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
  Horizontal Non-horizontal   Horizontal Non-horizontal   Horizontal Non-horizontal 
  Success Unsuccess Success Unsuccess   Success Unsuccess Success Unsuccess   Success Unsuccess Success Unsuccess 
Intercept -2.717* -9.075 -0.539 -18.085   -2.723* -9.226 -0.567 -18.083   -2.738* -9.074 -0.619 -17.933 
  (2.894) (0.002) (0.073) (0.003)   (2.924) (0.002) (0.082) (0.003)   (2.919) (0.002) (0.095) (0.003) 
Instown 1.17*** 0.326 1.144*** 1.102   1.17*** 0.322 1.144*** 1.102   1.169*** 0.33 1.142*** 1.11 
  (24.589) (0.453) (11.988) (2.112)   (24.585) (0.444) (11.988) (2.111)   (24.529) (0.466) (11.928) (2.136) 
IA/AT -1.686*** -0.656 -0.49 -1.262   -1.685*** -0.642 -0.486 -1.268   -1.685*** -0.645 -0.487 -1.263 
  (21.174) (0.836) (1.085) (1.057)   (21.183) (0.805) (1.071) (1.067)   (21.199) (0.811) (1.074) (1.06) 
ROA -0.003 -0.09 -0.012 0.013                     
  (0.003) (1.705) (0.032) (0.014)                     
ROE           0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001           
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            (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)           
MB                     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                      (0.006) (0.287) (0.023) (0.083) 
Log (size) -0.167*** -0.219* -0.178** 0.032   -0.167*** -0.216* -0.178** 0.033   -0.167*** -0.222* -0.176** 0.027 
  (10.662) (3.41) (5.224) (0.033)   (10.659) (3.329) (5.203) (0.034)   (10.408) (3.482) (4.962) (0.023) 
Log(Market 
share) -0.064 0.312** 0.058 -0.069   -0.065 0.301** 0.056 -0.068   -0.065 0.308** 0.054 -0.062 
  (1.564) (5.875) (0.56) (0.153)   (1.642) (5.522) (0.534) (0.15)   (1.64) (5.708) (0.485) (0.123) 
Growth rate -0.009 -0.028 0 -0.004   -0.009 -0.025 0 -0.004   -0.009 -0.025 0 -0.004 
  (0.417) (0.052) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.415) (0.049) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.417) (0.047) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage -0.284** -1.091** -0.113 0.013   -0.282** -1.034** -0.103 -0.001   -0.282** -1.033** -0.103 -0.001 
  (3.881) (4.232) (0.453) (0.013)   (4.091) (3.885) (0.442) (0.001)   (4.088) (3.875) (0.437) (0.002) 
Time dummies         - - - -   - - - -   - - - - 
Number of obs 377 75 176 32   377 75 176 32   377 75 176 32 
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Table6 Time dummy coefficients and the number of acquisitions in each year 
The time dummy for year 1985 is set to be a reference category and is not put into the regression. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Wald Chi-
Square value are shown in parentheses. 














1985 - - - - 0.56%   1998 2.442** 11.218 0.335 10.368 5.58% 
                (5.694) (0.003) (0.248) (0.001)   
1986 0.609 0.016 0.187 11.541 1.03%   1999 2.65*** 12.279 0.464 11.483 6.37% 
  (0.245) (0.000) (0.059) (0.001)       (6.724) (0.003) (0.482) (0.001)   
1987 1.656 11.41 -0.54 -0.013 2.99%   2000 2.454** 12.319 0.257 10.151 4.81% 
  (2.326) (0.003) (0.345) (0.000)       (5.715) (0.003) (0.14) (0.001)   
1988 0.897 11.785 0.106 12.144 1.38%   2001 2.469** 11.755 0.53 11.291 5.17% 
  (0.599) (0.003) (0.019) (0.001)       (5.835) (0.003) (0.651) (0.001)   
1989 0.936 12.15 0.545 11.453 1.40%   2002 2.09** 10.657 -0.264 11.361 3.72% 
  (0.651) (0.003) (0.58) (0.001)       (4.131) (0.002) (0.137) (0.001)   
1990 1.633 11.465 0.368 12.136 2.83%   2003 2.147** 10.014 -0.259 10.315 4.05% 
  (2.262) (0.003) (0.248) (0.001)       (4.363) (0.002) (0.133) (0.001)   
1991 1.455 10.76 -0.548 11.435 2.45%   2004 1.823* 10.894 0.151 11.491 2.69% 
  (1.746) (0.002) (0.355) (0.001)       (3.056) (0.002) (0.047) (0.001)   
1992 0.487 10.727 -1.302 -0.125 0.95%   2005 2.115** 10.959 0.244 -0.12 3.66% 
  (0.157) (0.002) (1.258) (0.000)       (4.167) (0.003) (0.124) (0.000)   
1993 0.838 11.366 -0.675 -0.134 1.30%   2006 1.699 10.958 0.321 11.038 2.39% 
  (0.522) (0.003) (0.536) (0.000)       (2.618) (0.003) (0.218) (0.001)   
1994 1.391 11.708 -0.382 11.778 2.21%   2007 2.016* 11.717 0.082 10.43 3.10% 
The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process 
- 24 - 
 
  (1.639) (0.003) (0.214) (0.001)       (3.737) (0.003) (0.013) (0.001)   
1995 1.952* 11.217 0.184 11.641 3.86%   2008 1.987* 12.327 -0.59 10.44 2.95% 
  (3.469) (0.003) (0.065) (0.001)       (3.606) (0.003) (0.546) (0.001)   
1996 1.91* 11.1 0.315 10.709 3.69%   2009 1.404 11.746 -0.345 10.532 1.69% 
  (3.357) (0.003) (0.206) (0.001)       (1.716) (0.003) (0.205) (0.001)   
1997 2.129** 0.458 0.463 -0.145 4.52%   2010 1.802* 11.535 0.069 -0.24 2.43% 
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Table7 Robustness test: What makes the firm to be a takeover target in the whole 7300 industry 
Dependent variable is defined as the probability of each of the following five events occurring during any given year 
t: (1) the firm attracts bidders that come from the some industry and successful complete the takeover, (2)  the firm 
attracts bidders that come from the some industry but fail at last, (3) the firm attracts bidders that are from non-
horizontal industry and success, (4) the firm attracts bidders that are from non-horizontal industry and fail at last or 
(5) the firm attracts no bidder. Instown is the institutional ownership in each firm, using the last December 31th data 
before the year t, reported on Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings database during the 
year previous to t. RELROA (RELROE) refers to ROA (ROE) for each specific firm divided by industry average 
ROA (ROE) during the year previous to t, respectively. Log (size) is the logarithm of market capitalization. Log 
(market share) represents the sales divided by the industry total sales during the year previous to t. Growth 
opportunity is calculated as the research & development expenses divided by the sales during the year previous to 
year t. Leverage is data during the year previous to year t. The year t indicates the year the firms is observed to be 
acquired or not to be acquired. Time dummies are omitted and will be displayed in following table. LR denotes to 
likelihood ratio for the total logistic model. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; Wald 
Chi-Square value are shown in parentheses. 
  (1)   (2) 
  Horizontal Non-horizontal   Horizontal Non-horizontal 
  Success Unsuccess Success Unsuccess   Success Unsuccess Success Unsuccess 
Intercept -2.746* -8.87 -0.402 -18.038   -2.724* -9.226 -0.567 -18.054 
  (2.953) (0.002) (0.041) (0.003)   (2.924) (0.002) (0.082) (0.003) 
Instown 1.17*** 0.331 1.137*** 1.107   1.169*** 0.322 1.145*** 1.107 
  (24.591) (0.471) (11.873) (2.129)   (24.578) (0.443) (11.995) (2.131) 
IA/AT -1.681*** -0.675 -0.513 -1.283   -1.685*** -0.642 -0.487 -1.267 
  (21.001) (0.89) (1.189) (1.091)   (21.193) (0.804) (1.075) (1.067) 
RELROA -0.009 0.14 0.055 0.026           
  (0.028) (1.444) (0.844) (0.08)           
RELROE           0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
            (0.026) (0.000) (0.010) (0.873) 
Log (size) -0.167*** -0.221* -0.18** 0.032   -0.167*** -0.216* -0.178** 0.033 
  (10.593) (3.519) (5.349) (0.033)   (10.648) (3.329) (5.205) (0.034) 
Log(Market share) -0.067 0.327** 0.07 -0.063   -0.065 0.301** 0.056 -0.064 
  (1.653) (6.358) (0.797) (0.126)   (1.637) (5.522) (0.534) (0.135) 
Growth rate -0.009 -0.03 0.000 -0.004   -0.009 -0.025 0.000 -0.004 
  (0.414) (0.053) (0.01) (0.007)   (0.415) (0.049) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage -0.275* -1.177** -0.16 -0.006   -0.282** -1.034** -0.103 -0.001 
  (3.621) (4.699) (0.786) (0.011)   (4.096) (3.885) (0.44) (0.001) 
Time dummies     - - - -   - - - - 
Number of obs 377 75 176 32   377 75 176 32 
LR 261***   260*** 
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Table8 Hausman test of IIA 
Ho: Outcome j and outcome k are independent of other alternatives. Column (1), (2) and (3) are derived 
when ROA, ROE and market-to-book ratio as independent variable, respectively. Category 1 refers to the 
horizontal successful takeovers, while category 2 is non-horizontal successful takeovers. Category 3 
represents horizontal unsuccessful takeovers and Category 4 is non-horizontal unsuccessful takeovers. The 
last category refers to firms don't receive any takeover bid in the given year. The “a” stands for Significance 
at 1%. 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Categories 
Chi-
square Conclude   Categories 
Chi-
square Conclude   Categories 
Chi-
square Conclude 
1 (0.00)a Ho   1 (0.00)a Ho   1 (0.00)a Ho 
2 (0.00)a Ho   2 (0.00)a Ho   2 (0.00)a Ho 
3 (0.00)a  Ho   3 (0.00)a  Ho   3 (0.00)a  Ho 
4 (0.00)a Ho   4 (0.00)a Ho   4 (0.00)a Ho 
5 (0.00)a Ho   5 (0.00)a Ho   5 (0.00)a Ho 
 
of horizontal successful takeovers’ appearance, significant relation at the 5% and the 
10% level can be observed as well. 
1.4 Robustness test 
In table 7, the multinomial logit regression model similar as section 1.3 is 
employed and the relative ROA and relative ROE are used as alternative proxies for 
firm’s performance. They are calculated as the ROA (ROE) for each firm divided by 
the industry average ROA (ROE) in corresponding year. The results for this test are the 
same as the results obtained in the former regression model, in which ROA and ROE 
are used. 
The multinomial logit model makes the assumption as independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). Under this assumption, each outcome of the dependent variable is 
irrelevant to each other, which means that adding or deleting any one category won’t 
affect the probability of the remaining ones. This assumption is usually explained by 
the example of making choice between blue and red bus and the car (see McFadden 
(1974) and Hensher (1986, 1991)). The Hausman test proposed by Hausman and 
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McFadden (1984) will be employed to test whether IIA holds.3  
   The null hypothesis for this test is that dependent variable’s outcome J and outcome 
k are independent of other alternatives. In the table 8, the testing results are shown. The 
column (1), (2) and (3) represents the situations when the ROA, ROE and market-to-
book ratio are the independent variable respectively. We can observed that none of the 
tests reject the Ho that IIA holds, and all of the tests get a Chi-square value of zero. 
Hausman and McFadden (1984) note that small Chi-square value proves that IIA has 
not been violated. Thus, we can conclude that the dependent variable of multinomial 
logit model in this paper follows the IIA and each outcome is independent and irrelevant.  
 
2. Cross-ownership and takeover success 
2.1 Logistic regression procedure  
  Based on 660 takeovers sample, this section examines the impact of cross-ownership 
on takeover success. All the acquisitions are divided into two categories, successful and 
unsuccessful. Utilizing the probability of takeover success or failure as the dependent 
variable, a binary logistic regression will model the relation between cross-holders’ 
shareholdings in acquirers and targets and this dependent variable. The observations of 
unsuccessful takeovers is designed to be the reference category. 
2.2 Variables design and statistics 
Table9 shows the statistics of each characteristic. 
With the cross-ownership in bidding firms and target firms as the major variable, the 
other independent variables are designed as follows. The takeover data is derived from 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions database. The institutional 
share data is from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) merger database and the 
other fundamental data is from COMPUSTAT database. 
                         
3
 Following Long and Freese (2006), the Hausman value is calculated as  
H= (𝛽?̂? − 𝛽∗𝐹
̂ )’[Var(̂𝛽?̂?) − Var̂(𝛽∗𝐹
̂ )]−1(𝛽?̂? − 𝛽∗𝐹
̂ )  
Where 𝛽?̂? is the estimator when estimating the full model with all J outcomes included. 𝛽?̂? is 
the estimator when the model is estimated restrictively. 𝛽∗
𝐹
̂  is a subset of 𝛽?̂?  after 
eliminating coefficients not estimated in the restricted model. 
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Table9 Summary statistics of observations 
The sample contains 660 takeovers from 1985-2010. Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the 
ownership of cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers 
and targets) in acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-
holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in target 
firms. Institutions' shares in acquirers (targets) is defined as shares held by institutional investors in 
acquirers (targets). Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-holders 
(institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in acquiring 
firms. Relative size is computed as market value of target firms divided by market value of acquiring 
firms. MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio before takeover. Log (market share) 
represents the sales divided by the industry total sales. Growth rate is calculated as the research & 








Successful takeover 553 83.788  660 
Unsuccessful takeover 107 16.212  660 
  Mean Median Std. Dev 
Cross-holders' shares in acquirers 0.149  0.104  0.152  
Cross-holders' shares in targets 0.136  0.038  0.195  
Institutions' shares in acquirers 0.493  0.527  0.295  
Institutions' shares in targets 0.367  0.324  0.273  
Intangible asset proportion 0.130  0.046  0.173  
Relative size 0.278 0.089  0.698  
MB 9.141  2.376  39.264  
Log (market share) -8.873  -9.064  1.519  
Growth rate 0.470  0.149  4.453  
Leverage 0.441  0.352  0.447  
  
Cross-holders refer to the institutional investors who have holdings in both 
acquirers and targets. This section seeks to identify the respective effects of cross-
holders’ shares in acquirers and targets before takeover. Based on the conclusion from 
earlier studies, we can predict that there is a positive relationship between cross-
ownership in targets and probability of takeover success, but this relation may be 
largely affected by pre-takeover trading for toeholds. On average, 14.9% and 13.6% 
shares in bidders and targets are held by the same institutional stockholders, median 
value of 10.4% and 3.8%. The data distribution is skewed and has a low level of 
standard deviation. 
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By the way, the institutional share stake in firms is also added as another main 
variables for testing. From the previous literature we see that as institutions  focus on 
removing value-reducing resistance, they will, to some extent, raise the chance of 
takeover success. In acquiring firms, an average 49.3% of shares are held by institutions, 
while 36.7% in targets’ shares. This data is uniformly distributed. 
Size effect is a classical variable when researching takeover topics. In this section, 
relative size, defined as the ratio of targets’ market value to bidders’ market value, is 
used. Targets’ market cap is, on average, 27.8% of acquirers’. The median pair in all 
the 660 takeovers has the target accounting for 8.9% of bidders’ market value. 
    Market-to-book ratio here is a proxy for firms’ performance. The badly performing 
firm and management are more likely to be driven out by the market. Thus the firms 
with a low market-to-book ratio before takeover are more likely to accept the takeover 
bid and a negative correlation is expected to be observed between MB ratio and the 
likelihood of takeover success. The target firms’ market value are, on average, 9.141 
times of their book value. 
    For the firms in 7300 industry, intangible assets proportion in total assets and the 
research & development expenses to sales (defined as growth rate) are still strategic. 
For all the 660 target firms, a mean of 13% of their total assets consist of intangible 
assets. And the growth rate has an average value of 47%. 
Market share will largely affect the success of horizontal takeovers when antitrust 
laws are powerful. Leverage is also a critical factor in horizontal mergers in 7300 
industry, but may not be a vital variable for vertical or conglomerate mergers.  
2.3 Empirical results 
 Table10 displays the regression results for the estimation procedure.  
   The cross-ownership in target firms before takeover shows a negative and 
significant relation with takeover success, at the 1% level, while the cross-holding in 
acquiring firms has no significant impact on the takeover results. This result is similar 
to the idea of Bris (2001), that some pre-bid trades occur and increase the target firms’  
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Table10 The impact of institutional cross-holders' ownership on probability of takeover success 
The sample contains 660 takeovers from 1985-2010. Dependent variable is defined as 1 if takeover 
completes and a value of 0 if fails. Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-
holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in 
acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in targets refers to the ownership of cross-holders (institutional 
investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in target firms. Institutions' 
shares in acquirers (targets) is defined as shares held by institutional investors in acquirers (targets). 
Relative size is computed as market value of target firms divided by market value of acquiring firms. 
MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio before takeover. Log (market share) represents 
the sales divided by the industry total sales. Growth rate is calculated as the research & development 
expenses divided by the sales. LR denotes to likelihood ratio for the total logistic model. *Significant 
at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Wald Chi-Square value are shown in parentheses. 
N=660 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -1.566* 0.044 -1.894*** -1.896** 
  (3.518) (0.003) (6.798) (4.838) 
Cross-holders' shares in acquirers 0.928       
  (1.267)       
Cross-holders' shares in targets   -1.473***     
    (7.652)     
Institutions' shares in acquirers     1.159***   
      (8.363)   
Institutions' shares in targets       0.78 
        (2.675) 
IA/AT -0.364 -0.053 -0.566 -0.362 
  (0.337) (0.007) (0.809) (0.342) 
Relative size -0.011 -0.012* -0.009 -0.011 
  (2.665) (2.871) (1.795) (2.626) 
MB -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** 
  (5.16) (4.607) (3.959) (4.776) 
Log (Market share) -0.366 -0.224*** -0.36 -0.385 
  (17.758) (7.562) (22.673) (20.199) 
Growth rate 0.014 0.025 0.014 0.012 
  (0.031) (0.067) (0.024) (0.027) 
Leverage 0.034 -0.083 0.015 0.068 
  (0.016) (0.11) (0.003) (0.06) 
LR 26*** 32*** 33*** 28*** 
 
stock price which makes the control bidder give up, or that acquirers already get the 
shares they want at a lower price by pre-takeover inside trading and do not need the 
takeover to complete any longer. 
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The results also show that greater institutional ownership in the acquiring firms 
will increase the likelihood of the merger completion. That can be attributed to Hart’s 
(1995) idea that institutions put a representative in management, who will serve for 
institutional investors, negotiate better with targets’ shareholders and adopt the 
suggestions from institutions at discovering good target firms. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) show that due to the large size of their stock investment, institutions have greater 
incentives to monitor the management. Hence, the managers are more likely to adopt 
beneficial decisions and complete these decisions when institutional ownership are 
greater in acquirers.   
   The 3-year average market-to-book ratio can have an important contribution to 
chance of takeover success. It has a significant negative relationship with the 
probability of takeover completion. As former study states, takeover is the effective 
way to drive out badly performing firms, stated by Jensen (1986), firms with lower 
market-to-book ratio are more likely to become targets. The market will drive out bad 
firms so that this kind of acquisitions obtains higher possibility to success. Furthermore, 
the shareholders in these firms may lose confidence about the firms’ profitability and 
the management, and are more willing to sell their shares. 
   When considering only column (2), we see that relative size and market share are 
inversely correlated with the likelihood of takeover success, at the level of significance 
10% and 5%, respectively. In a previous study, Branch, Wang and Yang (2008) find 
that transaction size has a significant negative impact on the likelihood of takeover 
success. Similarly, we find relative size (market value of target firms relatively to 
market value of acquiring firms) has a negative impact on the chance of takeover 
success. Smaller targets may find it more difficult to effectively defend against 
takeovers and are more easily acquired. Similarly, more resistance may occur when 
attempting to acquire firms with a large market share because of antitrust laws and the 
more powerful defenses. Accordingly, if bidders want to increase the likelihood of 
takeover success, relative size and the targets’ market share can be taken into account. 
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3. Cross-ownership and offer price 
3.1 Variables and regression procedure description 
   To identify the explanatory factors to influencing the takeover offer price, this 
section employs the ratio of offer price per share to market value per share as the 
dependent variable, and use the institutional cross-holding in targets and acquirers as 
the major explanatory. Based on the previous research conclusion, (see Bulow, Huang
and Klemperer (1999), Betton and Eckbo (2000), and Bris (2001)) a higher toehold can 
lead to lower pay off, we could anticipate that cross-owners’ higher holdings in target 
firms will lower the offer price. The institutional shares data is from Thomson Financial 
SDC Platinum (SDC) merger database and the other fundamental data is from 
COMPUSTAT database. The presence of takeover defenses, multiple bidders and 
theindustry classification data are derived from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
Mergers & Acquisitions database. Table11 presents the summary statistics for the 
variables. 
   Pre-takeover 3-year average market-to-book ratio and net operating assets (NOA) 
change are employed as proxies for pre-bid performance. Net operating assets only 
include the information of firms’ operating activities. It is computed by reformatting 
the balance sheet so that operating activities are separated from financing activities. 
Based on NOA, we can only focus on operating performance of the business, excluding 
financing performance, since the financing activities are considered not to create value 
for the firms in Business Service Industry. Utilizing NOA helps us get a more accurate 
valuation of the company performance. NOA is computed as 
  NOAt = (total assets – cash – short-term cash investment) – (total liability – total debt) 
Since the net operating assets may vary a lot along with firm size, we use the accrual 
ratio to measure the level of net operating assets change between two calendar years. 
Accrual ratio is calculated as  




Where (𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1) is defined as aggregate accruals, referring to the current  
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Table11 Summary statistics, indicator variables, and number of observations 
Offer price/market price stands for the ratio of bidders' offer price per share to targets' market share price at 
day (-6). Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-holders (institutional investors 
who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in 
targets refers to the ownership of cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both 
takeover acquirers and targets) in target firms. Institutions' shares in acquirers (targets) is defined as shares 
held by institutional investors in acquirers (targets). MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio 
before takeover. Accrual ratio is defined as the indicator of firms’ earning quality one year before takeover. 
Relative size is computed as market value of target firms divided by market value of acquiring firms. Defense 
is the indicator whether the target firms make takeover defense to reflect to takeover bids. Multiple bidder is 
an indicator and gets a value of 1 when more than one bidder exist, otherwise 0. Horizontal takeover is a 
binary variable with a value of 1 when bidders and targets are both from 7300 industry, otherwise 0. 






Dependent variable             
   Offer price/market price 1.429  1.364  0.424        
Independent variable             
   Cross-holders' share in acquirers 0.160  0.124  0.144        
   Cross-holders' share in targets 0.139  0.055  0.186        
   Institutions' shares in acquirers 0.527  0.552  0.274        
   Institutions' shares in targets 0.399  0.358  0.259        
   MB 3.683  2.354  4.916        
   Accrual ratio 0.243  0.214  1.858        
   Relative size 1.099  1.099  12.874        
   Defense       91 17.268  527 
   Multiple bidder       26 4.934  527 
   Horizontal takeover       376 71.347  527 
 
period’s change in non-cash balance sheet items, excluding the cash and debt. Since the 
aggregate accruals are the “discretionary” component of earnings apart from cash 
earnings, they are more likely to indicate management manipulation on earnings. When 
aggregate accruals is divided by (𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡−1)/2, we can remove the size effect 
and obtain the accrual ratio. As the increase of accrual ratio means the number of 
“discretionary” factors and level of manipulation grow, a higher accrual ratio indicates 
a lower quality of earnings and poorer performance.  
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   Whether a takeover defense is made by the target can also be an indicator of a hostile 
or friendly takeover. The one motive for anti-takeover measures is to drive up the offer 
price and it really works. Ruback (1987) finds defenses attract more bidders and slightly 
increases the offer price. From table 11, we can see in our sample, 17.27% of target 
firms adopt takeover defenses. 
   The presence of multiple bidders will reasonably lead to a higher bidding price due 
to the “winner’s curse”. Ravid and Spiegel (1997) also proposed that the toehold will 
only be observed when multiple bidders appear. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1986) report 
substantially greater gains for targets when multiple bidders exist. From table 11, we 
can see 4.93% bids have multiple bidders in our sample. 
    The horizontal indicator is added as well, with the goal to find out industry effect 
on the offer price. It has a value of 1 when acquirers are from 7300 industry, 0 otherwise. 
In our sample, 71.35% acquirers are from the SIC 7300 industry. 
3.2 Empirical results 
Table12 shows the regression results for the offer price. The cross-holders’ share in 
both acquirers and targets are negatively related to the dependent variable, the ratio of 
offer price to market price. This relation is similar with findings of Bulow, Huang and 
Klemperer (1999) and Betton and Eckbo (2000). Since the institutional investors hold 
shares in the two firms before bid, they tend to limit the offer price to a rational level 
and remove value-reducing resistance, according to Jarrell and Poulsen (1987). The 
results show that when the cross-holdings increase by 1% share in acquirers (targets), 
the ratio of offer price to market price can decrease by 0.0034 (0.00212), other factors 
controlled.  
   Similarly, the target firms with lower institutional shares need larger consideration 
to complete the acquisition. According to Hart (1995), institutions owning large stakes 
will put a representative in the investee’s management, a manager serving the interests 
of the institutions and making investee management less likely to extract value from 
the takeover, which lower the offer price. 
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Table12 The effect of cross-ownership on offer price level 
Offer price/market price is the ratio of bidders' offer price per share to targets' market share price at day (-6). Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of 
cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in targets refers to the 
ownership of cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in target firms. Institutions' shares in acquirers (targets) 
is defined as shares held by institutional investors in acquirers (targets). MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio before takeover. Accrual ratio is defined as 
the indicator of firms’ earning quality one year before takeover. Relative size is computed as market value of target firms divided by market value of acquiring firms. 
Defense is the indicator whether the target firms make takeover defense to reflect to takeover bids. Multiple bidder is an indicator and has a value of 1 when more than one 
bidder appear meantime, otherwise 0. Horizontal takeover is a binary variable with a value of 1 when bidders and targets are both from 7300 industry, otherwise 0. 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
N = 527 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 1.488*** 1.477*** 1.458*** 1.45*** 1.482*** 1.52*** 1.505*** 1.497*** 
  (54.264) (33.647) (63.491) (35.649) (36.754) (27.304) (44.627) (31.053) 
Cross-holders' share in acquirers -0.363*** -0.34***             
  (-2.853) (-2.624)             
Cross-holders' share in targets     -0.21** -0.212**         
      (-2.121) (-2.119)         
Institutions' shares in acquirers         -0.102 -0.131*     
          (-1.498) (-1.875)     
Institutions' shares in targets             -0.191*** -0.191*** 
              (-2.69) (-2.665) 
MB   -0.003   -0.002   -0.004   -0.003 
    (-0.73)   (-0.617)   (-1.089)   (-0.813) 
Accrual ratio   0.007   0.007   0.008   0.008 
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    (0.678)   (0.688)   (0.808)   (0.795) 
Relative size   -0.025   -0.023   -0.218***   -0.02 
    (-0.973)   (-0.921)   (-4.166)   (-0.788) 
Defense   0.113**   0.124**   0.119**   0.121** 
    (2.257)   (2.466)   (2.395)   (2.419) 
Multiple bidder   0.088   0.089   0.14   0.103 
    (1.037)   (1.045)   (1.638)   (1.217) 
Horizontal   -0.003   -0.008   0.01   -0.006 
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It is not surprising to observe that the presence of anti-takeover measures drives up the 
offer price. This result is already shown in former studies (see Ruback (1987)). One 
motive of defenses is to obtain higher takeover considerations. The appearance of any 
kind of takeover resistance is associated with a 12% increase in the ratio of offer price 
to market price. 
   We can find that the appearance of more than one bidder does not have any 
significant influence on offer price. While many bids increase the competitiveness, the 
pre-bid trading hidden by market liquidity may have greater impact. To guarantee the 
success of final acquisition, bidders could buy some trivial shares of targets in public 
market, which does have some influence on the final pay off, but not determinate. The 
exact shares bought and how the market treats the trading will decide the final effect.  
 
4. Event study and takeover cumulative abnormal returns 
4.1 Data and model descriptions 
  To obtain the cumulative abnormal returns, an event study is conducted. The return 
data is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The 
estimated window is set as (-275, -20) and only trading-day data is used. Then six event 
windows are employed: (0), (-5, +1), (-1, +1), (-5, +5), (-5, +20) and (-20, +20). If the 
firms bid for several targets in a very short term (240 workdays), only the first bid is 
retained while the later ones are dropped to reduce contamination.  
  To derive the cumulative abnormal returns of bidders and targets in the six event 
windows, three different estimated methods are employed to obtain abnormal returns: 
market model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. The CRSP equally-weighted 
market return in given day t is employed as market return.  
 Market model is   
       A𝑖,𝑡 = R𝑖,𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖 −  ?̂?𝑖R𝑚,𝑡 
where A𝑖,𝑡 stands for the excess return of firm i at day t; R𝑖,𝑡 represents the observed 
return of firms i at day t; ?̂?𝑖  and ?̂?𝑖 are the estimated coefficients from the regression  
The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process 
- 38 - 
 
Table13 Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets for different event window (full 
sample) 
The sample in Panel A contains bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions of public U.S. companies 
between 1985 and 2010. The sample in Panel B contains target firms in mergers and acquisitions of 
public U.S. firms. Three methods are employed to calculated cumulative abnormal returns over six 
event windows, market model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. Market equally-weighted 
returns are used as market returns.  Data are from CRSP stock price database. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Z score are shown in parentheses. 
  Event window 
  (0,0) (-5,+1) (-1,+1) (-5,+5) (-5,+20) (-20,+20) 
  Panel A. Acquiring firms' CAR (full sample) 
 Market- model (N=609)            
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.042*** -0.051*** 
  Median  -0.009 -0.015 -0.018 -0.023 -0.028 -0.029 
  Z score -12.822 -6.602 -11.553 -5.627 -4.679 -4.536 
              
Carhart four-factor model (N=613)         
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.052*** 
  Median  -0.009 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.02 -0.03 
  Z score -4.684 -4.229 -6.022 -3.822 -4.392 -3.938 
              
Raw return (N=597)            
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.006 0.013 
  Median  -0.01 -0.007 -0.016 -0.008 0.01 0.024 
  Z score -11.411 -4.402 -9.630 -2.694 0.072 2.135 
  Panel B. Target firms' CAR (full sample) 
 Market- model (N=613)            
  Mean  0.172*** 0.274*** 0.243*** 0.274*** 0.278*** 0.323*** 
  Median  0.095 0.238 0.203 0.243 0.246 0.3 
  Z score 36.675 19.729 29.545 15.223 9.248 9.022 
              
Carhart four-factor model (N=613)         
  Mean  0.173*** 0.276*** 0.245*** 0.277** 0.287*** 0.336*** 
  Median  0.097 0.234 0.206 0.248 0.252 0.304 
  Z score 5.632 6.865 7.482 2.342 5.837 5.632 
              
Raw return (N=598)            
  Mean  0.172*** 0.276*** 0.243*** 0.278*** 0.291*** 0.353*** 
  Median  0.095 0.241 0.203 0.243 0.258 0.325 
  Z score 33.060 18.697 27.019 14.498 9.703 10.794 
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model; R𝑚,𝑡 is the CRSP market equally-weighted return at day t. 
Carhart four-factor model is 
R𝑖,𝑡–R𝑓,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖,1 (R𝑚,𝑡 –R𝑓,𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖,2 SMBt + ?̂?𝑖,3 HMLt + ?̂?𝑖,4 UMDt  
where R𝑖,𝑡 represents the observed return of firms i; R𝑓,𝑡 is the risk-free rate, R𝑚,𝑡 
is the CRSP market equally-weighted return; SMBt is the difference between the return 
on the portfolio of “small” stocks and “big” Stocks; HMLt is the difference between  
the return on the portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks; UMDt is the 
difference between the return on the portfolio of past one-year “winners” and “losers,”; 
?̂?𝑖  stands for the excess return of firm i. ?̂?𝑖,1 ?̂?𝑖,2 ?̂?𝑖,3 and ?̂?𝑖,4 are the estimated 
coefficients from regression model. 
4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns 
Table 13 shows the statistics for cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms 
and target firms in six event windows, and z scores
4
 for testing the significance of 
abnormal returns are shown in parentheses. The results give average and median 
cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets in six event windows. Two 
subsamples in table14 and table15 are listed below and show the CARs when takeover 
bids complete or fail. 
    Previous studies have shown that takeovers are generally beneficial for targets but 
value-reducing for acquiring firms. The results of this analysis are consistent with the 
extant literature.  
For the total sample, the abnormal returns at the event day are significant negative 
for bidding firms at -1.9%, for all three models. On the event day for targets, we see 
significant positive returns, at 1.72% from market model and raw return and at 1.73% 
from Carhart four-factor model. Accounting for other event windows, the results have 
                         
4 The method to construct standardized test statistics are employed for Patell Z score for CAR. According to Patell 
(1976) and Mitchell and Lehn (1990),the test statistics for the CAR is (1/√𝑇) ∑ 𝑍𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,where T is the length of event 
window and 𝑍𝑡 stands for the test statistics for AR. Zt is computed as Zt = (1/√𝑁) ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡  and Standardized AR 










2⁄ , where σ2 stands for the estimated residual variance for the estimation period, L is the 
number of observations in the estimation period,  ?̅?𝑚  is the estimation period mean of the market return, and 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑚 is the corrected sum of squares of the market return during the event window. 
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the same direction for acquirers’ and targets’ gains. Therefore, a conclusion can be 
reached that in 7300 industry from 1985 to 2010, the firms receiving takeover bids 
achieve positive gains around the announcement, from minus 20 days to 20 days after 
the event day. Firms who make the takeover offers will lose during the bid 
announcement period.  
   However, when the total sample is divided into two subsamples, the results may be 
different. When only considering the subsample of successful takeovers, with the event 
day -1.9% returns, the event windows (-5, +1), (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) lose a bit more at -
2.3% , -2.9% and 2.7% from market model, compared to -2.1%, -2.7% and 2.8% loss 
of full sample. For the event window (-5, +20) and (-20, +20), the firms in successful 
subsample lose less than the total sample’s firms. For the targets firms who finally 
accepted the takeover offer, they do much better than the full-sample targets. At the 
event day, in the successful subsample, target firms earn 18.8% positive return on 
average by the three models, while in full sample, targets earn 17.2%. During (-5, +5), 
more than 29% returns are obtained by completed takeover targets, while targets in full 
sample obtain 27.4%, 27.7% and 27.8% returns calculated by market model, Carhart 
four-factor model and raw return, respectively. 
   When considering the bidding firms in the unsuccessful subsample, only the 
negative abnormal returns calculated by market model and raw return at the event day 
are significant, -1.9% and -1.8%, respectively, exactly the same as in full sample. For 
the other event windows (-5, +1) and (-1, +1), the subsample loss are reduced or even 
insignificant, while in the (-5, +5), (-5, +20) and (-20, +20) windows, the subsample of 
unsuccessful bidders suffer heavier loss than firms in the full sample. In contrast, the 
target firms in unsuccessful bids, obtain significant gains during all the event windows, 
but all the gains are slightly lower than the full-sample targets, 9.2% at the event day, 
19.6% over (-5, +1), 15.8% over (-1, +1), 19.0% over (-5, +5), 17.7% over (-5, +20) 
and 19.8% over the longest window (-20, +20).  
  Based on these results, a conclusion may be drawn that for the takeovers in 7300  
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Table14 Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets for different event window 
(successful takeovers) 
The sample in Panel A contains bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions of public U.S. companies 
between 1985 and 2010. The sample in Panel B contains target firms in mergers and acquisitions of 
public U.S. firms. Three methods are employed to calculated cumulative abnormal returns over six 
event windows, market model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. Market equally-weighted 
returns are used as market returns.  Data are from CRSP stock price database. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Z score are shown in parentheses. 
  Event window 
  (0,0) (-5,+1) (-1,+1) (-5,+5) (-5,+20) (-20,+20) 
  Panel A. Acquiring firms' CAR (successful takeovers) 
Market- model (N=510)           
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.049*** 
  Median  -0.01 -0.018 -0.021 -0.022 -0.025 -0.028 
  Z score -12.014 -6.537 -11.545 -5.327 -3.927 -3.971 
              
Carhart four-factor model (N=514)         
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.049*** 
  Median  -0.009 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 -0.02 -0.028 
  Z score -4.116 -4.153 -5.752 -3.088 -3.532 -3.836 
              
Raw return (N=503)           
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.014** 0.001 0.021** 
  Median  -0.011 -0.008 -0.017 -0.007 0.014 0.027 
  Z score -10.675 -4.418 -9.566 -2.509 0.710 2.451 
  Panel B. Target firms' CAR (successful takeovers) 
Market- model (N=515)           
  Mean  0.188*** 0.289*** 0.259*** 0.290*** 0.297*** 0.347*** 
  Median  0.107 0.248 0.212 0.253 0.261 0.323 
  Z score 98.69 58.433 80.826 46.717 31.342 28.901 
              
Carhart four-factor model (N=515)         
  Mean  0.188*** 0.291*** 0.259*** 0.296*** 0.317*** 0.385*** 
  Median  0.112 0.253 0.214 0.255 0.281 0.346 
  Z score 14.57 18.108 18.108 17.128 16.238 15.882 
              
Raw return (N=506)           
  Mean  0.188*** 0.289*** 0.259*** 0.292*** 0.306*** 0.360*** 
  Median  0.11 0.244 0.209 0.254 0.27 0.326 
  Z score 93.277 55.77 76.706 45.069 31.179 29.728 
 
The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process 
- 42 - 
 
 
Table15 Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers and targets for different event window 
(unsuccessful takeovers) 
The sample in Panel A contains bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions of public U.S. companies 
between 1985 and 2010. The sample in Panel B contains target firms in mergers and acquisitions of 
public U.S. firms. Three methods are employed to calculated cumulative abnormal returns over six 
event windows, market model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. Market equally-weighted 
returns are used as market returns. Data are from CRSP stock price database. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Z score are shown in parentheses. 
  Event window 
  (0,0) (-5,+1) (-1,+1) (-5,+5) (-5,+20) (-20,+20) 
  Panel A. Acquiring firms' CAR (unsuccessful takeovers) 
 Market- model (N=99)           
  Mean  -0.019*** -0.014* -0.016** -0.029** -0.06*** -0.058** 
  Median  -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.026 -0.039 -0.033 
  Z score -4.659 -1.695 -2.398 -2.008 -3.055 -2.360 
              
Carhart four-factor model (N=99)         
  Mean  -0.018 -0.014 -0.017 -0.029** -0.062*** -0.064*** 
  Median  -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.019 -0.028 -0.039 
  Z score -1.576 -0.537 -0.745 -1.992 -2.615 -2.823 
              
Raw return (N=94)           
  Mean  -0.018*** -0.009 -0.014** -0.019 -0.042* -0.024 
  Median  -0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.025 -0.003 
  Z score -4.198 -1.043 -2.138 -1.14 -1.797 -0.373  
  Panel B. Target firms' CAR (unsuccessful takeovers) 
 Market- model (N=98)           
  Mean  0.092*** 0.196*** 0.158*** 0.190*** 0.177*** 0.198*** 
  Median  0.042 0.148 0.089 0.158 0.126 0.148 
  Z score 20.622 16.537 21.706 13.032 7.864 7.135 
              
Carhart four-factor model (N=98)         
  Mean  0.093*** 0.193*** 0.157*** 0.184*** 0.156*** 0.188*** 
  Median  0.053 0.147 0.101 0.159 0.133 0.152 
  Z score 5.469 6.729 6.309 6.519 4.419 2.739 
              
Raw return (N=92)           
  Mean  0.095*** 0.206*** 0.166*** 0.197*** 0.184*** 0.203*** 
  Median  0.054 0.14 0.107 0.19 0.147 0.148 
  Z score 18.947 15.38 20.247 11.981 6.897 6.695 
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industry from 1985 to 2010, the acquiring firms will get a significant negative 
cumulative abnormal return while the target firms will achieve significant positive 
CARs during the event window (-20, +20) no matter which models are used to do the 
event study. However when the full sample is divided into two subsamples, successful 
bids and incomplete ones, we can find that target firms achieve more (better than the 
total sample) in successful takeovers and less (not as good as the full sample) in 
unsuccessful ones on average. The bidders lose a similar amount at the event day 
regardless of sample. 
4.3 Returns to institutional investors and cross-holders 
Table 16 gives the information of three different returns of shareholders in full 
sample. Column (1) is the cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring firms during the 
event window (-5, +5). It’s calculated as  
CAR 𝐴 = ∑𝑡 𝐴𝑅𝑡 
Column (2) is return to institutional holders that is computed as the total dollar 
return to institutional shareholders in acquirers and targets divided by the total value 
they hold in acquirers and targets. It’s calculated as  
Return to institutional holders =  
CAR 𝐴  × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐴 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐴 + CAR 𝑇  ×  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑇 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑇
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐴  × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐴 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑇  × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑇
 
Column (3) is cross-ownership adjusted return which is computed as the total 
dollar return of institutions who have shares both in acquirers and targets, divided by 
the total value they hold in acquirers and targets. It’s calculated as 
  Return to cross-ownership = 
CAR 𝐴 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐴×𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝐴+CAR 𝑇 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑇×𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑇
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝐴 ×𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝐴+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑇 ×𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑇
 
    In column (1), we see that the bidders, on average, suffer a 2.8% loss by market 
model, 2.7% loss by Carhart four-factor model and 1.5% loss by raw return. All of these 
results are significant at the 1% level. Based only on these results, we may conclude 
that acquiring firms generally suffer a loss.  
    However, when we consider the institutional investors and the institutional cross-
ownership, the results reversed. The returns to institutional holders and cross-ownership  
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Table16  Returns to institutional investor around merger announcements, full sample 
The sample contains bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions of public U.S. companies between 1985 and 
2010. Three methods are employed to calculated cumulative abnormal returns over six event windows, 
market model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. Market equally-weighted returns are used as 
market returns. Return on acquirer stock is the acquirers' CAR on (-5, +5). Return to institutional holders is 
computed as the total dollar return to institutional shareholders in acquirers and targets divided by the total 
value they hold in acquirers and targets. Cross-ownership adjusted return refers to the total dollar return of 
institutions, who has shares both in acquirers and targets, divided by the total value they hold in acquirers 
and targets. Daily price data are from CRSP stock price database. Institutional shares data is derived from 
Thomson Financial CDA/ Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holding database. *Significant at 10%; **Significant 
at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
    
Return on 
acquirer 
stock   
Return to 
institutional 
holders   
Cross-
ownership 
adjusted return   
Return 
difference   
Return 
difference 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (2-1)   (3-1) 
Market model             
  Mean    -0.028***   0.004   -0.003   0.034***   0.027*** 
  Median    -0.023   0.003   -0.001   0.009   0.003 
  t value   -4.930   0.54   -0.53   6.91   9.23 
Size of the sample   618   579   559   579   559 
                      
Carhart 4 factor model              
  Mean    -0.027***   0.007   0.0003   0.035***   0.028*** 
  Median    -0.017   0.004   0.0002   0.01   0.003 
  t value   -4.620   0.93   -0.04   6.92   8.85 
Size of the sample   604   566   545   566   545 
                      
Raw return                 
  Mean    -0.015***   0.017**   0.009   0.034***   0.027*** 
  Median    -0.008   0.017   0.011   0.009   0.003 
  t value   -2.630   2.37   1.34   6.78   9.19 
Size of the sample   622   583   562   583   562 
 
are not significantly different from zero and the average value of these two kinds of 
return is positive. The institution investors achieve a significant positive return of 1.7% 
when using raw return. In column (3), when calculating the total returns in bidders and 
targets for the institutional cross-holders, they gain an insignificant negative return of -
0.3% calculated by market model, an insignificant positive return of 0.03% computed 
by Carhart four-factor model, and an insignificant positive return of 0.9% from raw 
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return. Therefore, on average, the institutional investors of acquiring firms do not have 
significant negative returns during takeover process. 
Another way to assess the impact of cross-ownership on the returns is to analyze 
the difference in acquirer stock returns and the cross-ownership adjusted returns, a 
value derived from the mean value in column (3) minus the mean value in column (1). 
The difference for three models is all about 2.7%, significant at the 1% level. These 
results indicate that the acquirers’ stockholders with or without ownership in target 
firms will have significantly different excess returns. This result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4 and Matvos and Ostrovsky’s (2008) conclusion. 
  When the full sample is divided into successful and unsuccessful subsamples, a 
similar result to the full sample can be found, significant negative returns to the acquirer 
stock and insignificant positive returns to cross-holders. Meanwhile, a significant 
difference exists between the acquiring firms’ shareholder returns and the cross-owners’ 
returns. 
  The subsample incorporating unsuccessful takeovers in table 18 get a slightly 
different result. During the event window (-5, +5), the acquirers’ returns are not very 
significant, -3.1% return derived from market model at 5% significant level, -3.0% 
return calculated from Carhart four-factor model at 10% significant level and raw return 
insignificant. The returns to institutional investors and institutional cross-owners show 
the same tendency with the full sample, both insignificant. The difference between all 
acquirers’ returns and cross-holders’ return is still significant at the 1% level. 
Consequently, whether the takeover offer to 7300 industry firms succeeds or not, 
the institutional investors with cross-ownership will not suffer significant losses from 
the offer. This conclusion may encourage the cross-holders to vote for management’s 
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Table17   Returns to institutional investor around merger announcements (successful sample) 
The sample contains bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions of public U.S. companies between 1985 
and 2010. Three methods are employed to calculated cumulative abnormal returns over six event 
windows, market model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. The market model uses market 
equal-weighted returns.  Return on acquirer stock is the acquirers' CAR on (-5, +5). Return to 
institutional holders is computed as the total dollar return to institutional shareholders in acquirers and 
targets divided by the total value they hold in acquirers and targets. Cross-ownership adjusted return 
refers to the total dollar return of institutions, who has shares both in acquirers and targets, divided by 
the total value they hold in acquirers and targets. Daily price data are from CRSP stock price database. 
Institutional shares data is derived from Thomson Financial CDA/ Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holding 
database. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 




stock   
Return to 
institutional 
holders   
Cross-
ownership 
adjusted return   
Return 
difference   
Return 
difference 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (2-1)   (3-1) 
Market model             
  Mean    -0.028***   0.003    -0.006    0.033***   0.025*** 
  Median    -0.023    0.004    -0.001    0.009    0.002  
  t value   -4.449    0.380    -0.814    6.054    8.107  
 Sample size   517   486   471   486   471 
                      
Carhart 4 factor model              
  Mean    -0.027***   0.006    -0.002    0.035***   0.026*** 
  Median    -0.017    0.005    -0.002    0.010    0.002  
  t value   -4.181    0.808    -0.280    6.132    7.815  
Sample size   509   479   463   479   463 
                      
Raw return             
  Mean    -0.015**   0.018**   0.008    0.034***   0.026*** 
  Median    -0.007    0.018    0.009    0.009    0.002  
  t value   -2.271    2.298    1.153    6.138    8.287  
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Table18  Returns to institutional investor around merger announcements, unsuccessful sample 
The sample contains bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions of public U.S. companies between 1985 and 
2010. Three methods are employed to calculate cumulative abnormal returns over six event windows, market 
model, Carhart four-factor model and raw returns. The market model uses market equal-weighted returns.  
Return on acquirer stock is the acquirers' CAR on (-5, +5). Return to institutional holders is computed as the 
total dollar return to institutional shareholders in acquirers and targets divided by the total value they hold in 
acquirers and targets. Cross-ownership adjusted return refers to the total dollar return of institutions, who has 
shares both in acquirers and targets, divided by the total value they hold in acquirers and targets. Daily price 
data are from CRSP stock price database. Institutional shares data is derived from Thomson Financial CDA/ 
Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holding database. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 
1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 




stock   
Return to 
institutional 
holders   
Cross-
ownership 
adjusted return   
Return 
difference   
Return 
difference 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (2-1)   (3-1) 
Market model             
  Mean    -0.031**   0.008    0.009    0.037***   0.036*** 
  Median    -0.027    -0.011    0.000    0.006    0.011  
  t value   -2.120    0.504    0.579    3.588    4.448  
Sample size   101   93   88   93   88 
                      
Carhart 4 factor model              
  Mean    -0.030*   0.008    0.009    0.038***   0.036*** 
  Median    -0.021    -0.001    0.003    0.007    0.012  
  t value   -1.953   0.482    0.560    3.399    4.203  
Sample size   95   87   82   87   82 
                      
Raw return             
  Mean    -0.021    0.012    0.012    0.032***   0.031*** 
  Median    -0.012    0.013    0.021    0.005    0.010  
  t value   -1.360    0.659    0.690    2.910    3.956  
Sample size   101   93   88   93   88 
 
5. Cross-ownership and takeover returns 
5.1 Variables design 
The main purpose of this section is to examine how the takeover premiums and the 
institutional investors’ returns will be affected by the cross-ownership in target firms 
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and acquiring firms before takeover. Accordingly, the impact of cross-owners’ shares 
in acquirers and targets are tested by three kinds of returns: the cumulative abnormal 
returns to acquirers (derived from market model), the returns to institutional investors, 
and the returns to cross-ownership.  
To control the other factors that may have influence on the returns, I employ several 
explanatory variables. The pre-takeover market-to-book ratio works as a proxy for 
performance, and accrual ratio serves as a proxy for earning quality and future stock 
returns. Servaes (1991) finds that firms (acquirers and targets) with lower Tobin’s Q 
will achieve higher total returns, which confirms Lang, Stulz, and Walkling’s (1989) 
findings that taking over poorly performing firms can create more value. Similarly, we 
expect that the accrual ratio will have a positive relation with the takeover returns, as a 
higher accrual ratio indicates lower earning quality. 
Previous studies also show that the other characteristics of takeovers, for instance, 
hostile or friendly, single or multiple bidders, horizontal or outside market, medium of 
exchange and relative size, also have some impacts on the takeover premiums. These 
characteristics are added into the regression model in this paper as control variables as 
well.  
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that increasing market power can gain 
takeover synergy. Therefore, horizontal takeovers may lead to higher premiums. They 
also expect that synergistic takeovers to be friendly takeovers, so that the targets of 
takeovers without defenses will be more likely to obtain positive returns. 
Huang and Walkling (1987) find that the takeover abnormal returns are more 
associated with cash takeovers, while they are less associated with stock exchange ones, 
and that the takeovers with defenses earn insignificantly higher returns than the 
takeovers without defenses. 
 The idea of adding the payment medium as a control variable is based on Carleton, 
Guilkey, Harris, and Stewart’s (1983) finding that the medium of exchange plays a 
critical role in takeovers. Stimmelmayr, Liberini and Russo (2014) find that if the 
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acquisition incorporates a toehold, the taxes on capital gains will discourage cash 
payments, which is consistent with the findings of Travlos (1987) and Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins (1987). Thus, in order to reduce tax, acquirers are more willing to pay 
considerations by other mediums than cash. Travlos (1987) finds that there are 
significant differences between cash-financing and pure stock exchange in the takeover 
returns of acquiring firms. The medium is a binary variable, which equals 1 if all the 
considerations are paid by cash, and equals 0 otherwise. 
5.2 The empirical results 
Table 19 presents the results of the regression procedure. It is consistent with my 
prediction that institutional investors’ holdings negatively affect the takeover premiums. 
When the cross-ownership in bidders increases by 1%, the total acquirers’ return drops 
by 0.118%, which is significant at 1% level. The relation between cross-holders’ share 
in target firms and takeover returns to bidders is negative but insignificant. The relation 
between institutional investors’ total return and the cross-owners’ total return presents 
a similar pattern. The number of targets’ shares owned by cross-holders does not 
significantly affect the final returns to any kind of acquirers, while the number of 
bidders’ shares owned by cross-holders has an adverse effect to all kinds of acquirers. 
The returns to cross-holders can be explained as a real gain to the investors who have 
shares in both the acquirers and the targets. Correspondingly, the institutional cross-
holders should give up a slight fraction of their shares in acquirers before those firms 
make takeover bids to firms in 7300 industry firms, compared to the findings of Bris 
(2001) and Goldman and Qian (2005) that an optimal toehold size should be acquired 
before takeover announcement in order to maximize profits. When every 1% shares in 
acquiring firms are abandoned, cross-holders achieve 0.151% higher return in takeover 
activity. 
Except for the shares in acquirers, the pre-takeover market-to-book ratio and the 
choice of cash payment shows a significant impact on the takeover gains as well. The 
market-to-book ratio is negatively related to takeover gains while cash payment is 
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positively related to takeover gains, which are consistent with the anticipation. 
5.3 Robustness test 
Table 19 exhibits the results for returns derived from market model. To test the 
conclusion, two additional models, Carhart four-factor model in table 20 and raw 
returns in table 21, are employed to calculate the dependent variables.  
  According to the tables, when raw return is used to calculate acquirers’ premium, the 
results are less significant, but still have a negative relation at the 5% level between 
cross-holders’ shares in acquiring firms and return to cross-ownership. When Carhart 
four-factor model is employed, similar results are displayed. Besides shares in acquirers, 
the pre-takeover market-to-book ratio and medium of payment also have impacts on 
returns. And for the column (1) and (2), acquirers’ total returns in takeover activities 
are negatively influenced by the presence of defenses. This result is consistent with 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1988) conclusion, that only friendly takeovers seem to 
be synergetic. 
 
6. Takeover returns and post-takeover performance 
6.1 Variables and data description 
This section is designed to examine the takeover returns’ impact on post-takeover 
performance, especially the return to cross-ownership. Four ratios:  market-to-book 
ratio, ROA, ROE and accrual ratio, are employed in this section to be  proxies for firm 
performance. 
Table 22 shows the average value, mean and standard deviation of four performance 
ratios related to pre-takeover target firms and acquiring firms, and to post-takeover 
acquiring firms. In Panel A, B and C, column (4) presents the paired t test statistics for 
the performance difference of bidders and targets before takeover is made. And column 
(5) shows the paired t test statistics for the performance difference of a same bidder 
before and after takeover activity.  
For the total sample before acquisition announcement, ROA and ROE of target firms 
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are lower than the average ROA and ROE of bidders. Acquired firms have an average 
ROA of -17.8% and average ROE of -34.3% compared to -7.3% ROA and -2.0% ROE 
of acquirers. And the difference for ROA is significant at 1% level. In contrast, targets 
on average have a significantly higher market-to-book ratio than bidders before 
takeovers, which is 9.45 of targets compared to 3.59 of bidders. The accrual ratio for 
two kinds of firms shows no significant difference. Moreover, when the full sample is 
divided into two subsamples of successful acquisitions and other acquisitions, the 
results arrive at the same conclusions. Therefore, in 7300 industry, many takeover 
offers are made by the bidders who have lower share price premiums but higher returns 
on assets. According to the idea of Servaes (1991), firms with low Tobin’s Q will 
eventually suffer heavy losses if they try to merg with firms having a high Tobin’s Q. 
This conclusion may be a reasonable explanation for the trend of post-takeover ratios. 
The firms making acquisition bids suffer from a tremendous drop in market-to-book 
ratio after the bid, and this phenomenon can also be applied to two subsamples. From 
1985 to 2010, in 7300 industry, firms are mostly offered takeover bid by the bidders 
whose share price is more close to book value, and the bidders who have a lower MB 
ratio afterwards. The accrual ratio, however, reflects a better condition for the acquiring 
firms in the full sample and the subsample of successful acquisitions. The significant 
decrease in the accrual ratio implies an improvement in firms’ earning quality.  
In terms of the subsample of the failed firms, unsuccessful takeover bids will only 
lead to a decline in MB ratio with no significant effect on other ratios. Virtually, the 
performance ratio is not obviously influenced by the failure of the bidding. The change 
of market-to-book ratio is aroused by the negative return around the event window.  
  In general, bidding firms suffer from worse performance, which is measured by 
market-to-ratio, after the bid. This conclusion applies for all samples. 
  Panel D tests the takeovers’ effects on the target firms that refuse to accept the bid. 
This group of firms still exist in public market after takeover bid. When focusing on 
column (4), it should be noted that the target firms which turn down the bid will suffer   
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Table19 Impact of characteristics on different takeover cumulative abnormal returns, CARs calculated by market model  
Column (1) and (2) employs the CARs of acquirer stock during (-5, +5) event window as dependent variable. Column (3) to (4) uses returns to institutional investors' total 
returns as dependent variable. Column (5) to (6) sets the cross-owners' returns as dependent variable. Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-
holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in targets refers to the ownership 
of cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in target firms. MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book 
ratio before takeover. Accrual ratio is defined as the indicator of firms’ earning quality one year before takeover. Relative size is computed as market value of target firms 
divided by market value of acquiring firms. Defense is the indicator whether the target firms make takeover defense to reflect to takeover bids. Multiple bidder is an 
indicator and gets a value of 1 when more than one bidder appear meantime, otherwise 0. Horizontal takeover is a binary variable with a value of 1 when bidders and targets 
are both from 7300 industry, otherwise 0. Medium is the binary variable with a value of 1 when the takeover considerations are paid only by cash, 0 otherwise. *Significant 
at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  Return on acquirer stock   Return to institutional investors   Adjusted return to cross-ownership 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.003 0.016   0.02 0.028   0.014 0.044* 
  (0.15) (0.69)   (0.75) (1.04)   (0.61) (1.92) 
Cross-holders' share in targets -0.041     -0.04     -0.003   
  (-1.26)     (-1.06)     (-0.1)   
Cross-holders' share in acquirers   -0.118***     -0.094*     -0.151*** 
    (-2.73)     (-1.86)     (-3.48) 
Relative size -0.001 0.000   0.028 0.03   0.024 0.024 
  (-0.07) (0.03)   (1.44) (1.53)   (1.4) (1.44) 
MB -0.003*** -0.003***   -0.004*** -0.004***   -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-2.72) (-2.73)   (-2.72) (-2.74)   (-3.38) (-3.29) 
Accrual ratio -0.002 -0.002   0.001 0.000   -0.001 -0.001 
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  (-0.54) (-0.64)   (0.15) (0.09)   (-0.24) (-0.4) 
Defense -0.027 -0.03*   0.002 0.000   -0.009 -0.012 
  (-1.57) (-1.74)   (0.11) (-0.01)   (-0.52) (-0.72) 
Multiple bidder -0.027 -0.027   0.025 0.026   0.011 0.009 
  (-0.88) (-0.88)   (0.7) (0.72)   (0.37) (0.31) 
Horizontal 0.001 0.001   0.000 0.001   0.007 0.006 
  (0.07) (0.11)   (0.02) (0.06)   (0.49) (0.44) 
Takeover status -0.022 -0.021   -0.012 -0.01   -0.019 -0.024 
  (-1.17) (-1.15)   (-0.54) (-0.47)   (-0.98) (-1.32) 
Medium 0.04*** 0.041***   0.027 0.027*   0.028* 0.031** 
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Table20 Impact of characteristics on different takeover cumulative abnormal returns, CARs calculated by raw returns  
Column (1) and (2) employs the CARs of acquirer stock during (-5, +5) event window as dependent variable. Column (3) to (4) uses returns to institutional investors' total 
returns as dependent variable. Column (5) to (6) sets the cross-owners' returns as dependent variable. Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-
holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in targets refers to the ownership of 
cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in target firms. MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio 
before takeover. Accrual ratio is defined as the indicator of firms’ earning quality one year before takeover. Relative size is computed as market value of target firms divided 
by market value of acquiring firms. Defense is the indicator whether the target firms make takeover defense to reflect to takeover bids. Multiple bidder is an indicator and 
gets a value of 1 when more than one bidder appear meantime, otherwise 0. Horizontal takeover is a binary variable with a value of 1 when bidders and targets are both from 
7300 industry, otherwise 0. Medium is the binary variable with a value of 1 when the takeover considerations are paid only by cash, 0 otherwise. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  CAR on acquirer stock   CAR to institutional investors   Adjusted CAR to cross-ownership 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.007 0.016   0.017 0.021   0.012 0.038 
  (0.31) (0.68)   (0.60) (0.76)   (0.49) (1.58) 
Cross-holders' share in targets -0.027     -0.022     0.013   
  (-0.79)     (-0.55)     (0.37)   
Cross-holders' share in acquirers   -0.081*     -0.052     -0.11** 
    (-1.78)     (-0.98)     (-2.41) 
Relative size -0.008 -0.006   0.02 0.021   0.014 0.014 
  (-0.42) (-0.37)   (0.99) (1.04)   (0.79) (0.77) 
Pre-takeover MB ratio -0.001 -0.001   -0.002 -0.002   -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.95) (-0.94)   (-1.29) (-1.3)   (-1.56) (-1.44) 
Pre-takeover accrual ratio 0.003 0.003   0.005 0.005   0.004 0.003 
  (0.85) (0.78)   (1.21) (1.17)   (1.04) (0.93) 
Defense -0.016 -0.018   0.017 0.015   0.005 0.002 
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  (-0.91) (-1.02)   (0.79) (0.73)   (0.25) (0.13) 
Multiple bidder 0.000 0.000   0.05 0.05   0.038 0.036 
  (-0.01) (-0.01)   (1.31) (1.32)   (1.16) (1.1) 
Horizontal -0.012 -0.011   -0.01 -0.009   -0.004 -0.005 
  (-0.79) (-0.77)   (-0.56) (-0.54)   (-0.25) (-0.33) 
Takeover status -0.014 -0.013   0.000 0.001   -0.006 -0.013 
  (-0.71) (-0.7)   (0.00) (0.05)   (-0.32) (-0.64) 
Medium 0.029* 0.03**   0.019 0.019   0.018 0.021 
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Table21 Impact of characteristics on different takeover cumulative abnormal returns, CARs calculated by Carhart four-factor model 
Column (1) and (2) employs the CARs of acquirer stock during (-5, +5) event window as dependent variable. Column (3) to (4) uses returns to institutional investors' total 
returns as dependent variable. Column (5) to (6) sets the cross-owners' returns as dependent variable. Cross-holders' shares in acquirers refers to the ownership of cross-
holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in acquiring firms. Cross-holders' shares in targets refers to the ownership of 
cross-holders (institutional investors who have shareholdings in both takeover acquirers and targets) in target firms. MB is defined as 3 years average market-to-book ratio 
before takeover. Accrual ratio is defined as the indicator of firms’ earning quality one year before takeover. Relative size is computed as market value of target firms divided 
by market value of acquiring firms. Defense is the indicator whether the target firms make takeover defense to reflect to takeover bids. Multiple bidder is an indicator and 
gets a value of 1 when more than one bidder appear meantime, otherwise 0. Horizontal takeover is a binary variable with a value of 1 when bidders and targets are both 
from 7300 industry, otherwise 0. Medium is the binary variable with a value of 1 when the takeover considerations are paid only by cash, 0 otherwise. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  CAR on acquirer stock   CAR to institutional investors   Adjusted CAR to cross-ownership 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.001 0.014   0.016 0.026   0.012 0.043* 
  (-0.04) (0.61)   (0.62) (0.99)   (0.51) (1.95) 
Cross-holders' share in targets -0.025               
  (-0.75)               
Cross-holders' share in acquirers   -0.105**   -0.021 -0.077   0.015 -0.137*** 
    (-2.47)   (-0.54) (-1.54)   (0.46) (-3.21) 
Relative size -0.003 -0.002   0.024 0.025   0.02 0.02 
  (-0.19) (-0.13)   (1.25) (1.3)   (1.19) (1.19) 
Pre-takeover MB ratio -0.003** -0.003**   -0.004*** -0.004***   -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-2.28) (-2.26)   (-2.87) (-2.87)   (-3.27) (-3.14) 
Pre-takeover accrual ratio -0.002 -0.002   0.001 0.001   0.000 -0.001 
  (-0.48) (-0.58)   (0.31) (0.25)   (-0.15) (-0.31) 
Defense -0.035** -0.038**   -0.003 -0.005   -0.017 -0.02 
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  (-2.08) (-2.23)   (-0.16) (-0.25)   (-0.98) (-1.16) 
Multiple bidder -0.024 -0.025   0.027 0.027   0.013 0.01 
  (-0.8) (-0.82)   (0.76) (0.75)   (0.41) (0.33) 
Horizontal 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.005 0.003 
  (-0.03) (-0.03)   (-0.01) (0.00)   (0.33) (0.23) 
Takeover status -0.017 -0.017   -0.003 -0.004   -0.014 -0.021 
  (-0.9) (-0.96)   (-0.16) (-0.17)   (-0.72) (-1.16) 
Medium 0.034** 0.036**   0.018 0.019   0.023 0.027* 
  (2.41) (2.53)   (1.08) (1.14)   (1.61) (1.9) 
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Table22 Statistics of performance proxies before and after takeover 
Column (1) gives 3-year average performance ratio before takeover bids for targets. For Panel A, B and C, column (2) gives 3-year average ratio before takeover bids for 
acquirers. For Panel D, column (2) is 3-year average ratio after takeover bids for targets. Column (3) gives 3-year average ratio after takeover bids for acquirers. Column (4) 
are the paired t test statistics for the difference between (1) and (2). Column (5) are the paired t test statistics for the difference between (1) and (3). *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.  
  Pre-takeover targets (1)   Pre-takeover acquirers (2)   Post-takeover acquirers (3)   (4)=(2)-(1)   (5)=(3)-(2) 
  Mean Std. Dev Median   Mean Std. Dev Median   Mean Std. Dev Median   t statistics   t statistics 
  Panel A. Full sample (N=647) 
MB ratio 9.450  40.095  2.414    3.594  4.932  2.242    2.286  1.679  1.833    -3.710***   -7.01*** 
ROA -0.178  0.402  -0.041    -0.073  0.479  0.038    -0.104  2.893  0.024    5.120***   -1.49 
ROE -0.343  0.021  0.021    -0.020  0.959  0.099    0.101  0.968  0.064    1.07   -2.24** 
Accrual ratio 0.287  7.658  0.267    0.243  1.858  0.214    -0.002  0.523  0.108    0.040   -1.67* 
  Panel B. Completed takeovers (N=541) 
MB ratio 8.326  36.425  2.374    3.554  4.816  2.220    2.316  1.650  1.838    -3.000***   -6.23*** 
ROA -0.180  0.391  -0.043    -0.078  0.510  0.038    -0.113  0.463  0.027    4.510***   -1.44 
ROE -0.365  8.385  0.026    -0.037  0.921  0.100    -0.140  1.013  0.069    0.91   -1.78* 
Accrual ratio 0.144  7.079  0.282    0.253  1.157  0.210    0.094  0.508  0.110    0.65   -2.92*** 
  Panel C. Uncompleted takeovers (N=106) 
MB ratio 15.233  55.132  2.431    3.797  5.507  2.310    2.130  1.825  1.700    -2.21**   -3.22*** 
ROA -0.168  0.455  -0.023    -0.047  0.270  0.023    -0.057  0.271  0.018    2.46**   -0.380 
ROE -0.230  1.624  0.003    0.070  1.135  0.083    -0.103  0.702  0.038    1.60   -1.55 
Accrual ratio 1.031  10.160  0.153    0.191  3.814  0.293    0.138  0.593  0.089    -0.88   0.21 
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  Panel D. Uncompleted takeovers (N=106) 
  Pre-takeover targets (1)   Post-takeover targets (2)   Post-takeover acquirers (3)   (4)=(2)-(1)   (5)=(3)-(2) 
  Mean Std. Dev Median   Mean Std. Dev Median   Mean Std. Dev Median   t statistics   t statistics 
MB ratio 15.233  55.132  2.431    3.670  5.050  2.404    2.130  1.825  1.700    -2.25**   -3.01*** 
ROA -0.168  0.455  -0.023    -0.163  0.474  -0.008    -0.057  0.271  0.018    0.570    2.39** 
ROE -0.230  1.624  0.003    -0.370  1.911  0.011    -0.103  0.702  0.038    -1.67*   1.490  
Accrual ratio 1.031  10.160  0.153    2.729  14.267  0.286    0.138  0.593  0.089    2.35**   -1.75* 
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poor performance in the next three years. The MB ratio and ROE drops largely at 5% 
and 10% significance level, with accrual ratio rising synchronously. It might be because 
the target firms refuse to receive new technology, higher market power, better 
management and improved competiveness when they turn down the bid. 
6.2 Empirical results 
   Table 23 shows the impact of takeover returns on the change of performance ratio. 
Column (1), (4), (7) and (10) employ return to acquirers as the main explanatory factor. 
When market model are used to run the event study, a significant negative relation can 
be observed between the change in ROA and bidder returns. And the bidders’ gains will 
have positive effect on market-to-book ratio change if raw returns are used. This can be 
attributed to the synergy effect produced by the consolidation and it will benefit the 
market value of the firms afterwards. 
Institutional investors’ return is the main factor in column (2), (5), (8) and (11). 
All models produce positive correlations between the main variable and MB ratio 
change, which indicates that institutions are always good at seeking attractive targets 
and achieving capital premiums. 
Column (3) (6) (9) and (12) use adjusted return to cross-ownership as independent 
variables. The growth of cross-holders’ return also increases the MB ratio. 
Consequently, the increase of all kinds of returns will finally drive up the market-
to-book ratio. When measured with MB ratio, acquiring firms’ post-takeover 
performance will change positively if they perform well in the takeovers. 
6.3 Robustness test 
To test the effectiveness of this model and to examine the different effects on 
successful and unsuccessful bids, the total sample is divided into two subsamples 
according to the takeover results. Table 24 presents the results of the subsample of 
successful firms, which are similar to the results of full sample. Higher takeover 
returns contributes to higher market-to-book ratio, compared to the pre-takeover MB 
ratio, but it will lead to lower ROA after acquisition. 
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Table23 Impact of different returns on post-takeover performance, CARs calculated in three methods (full sample) 
The change from pre-takeover ratio to post ratio is employed as dependent variable. Three kinds of returns are the major independent variables. Column (1) (4) (7) and (10) 
used return on acquirer stock as independent variables. Column (2), (5), (8) and (11) used return to institutional investors as independent variables. Column (3) (6) (9) and 
(12) used adjusted return to cross-ownership as independent variables. Returns are derived from (-5, +5). N refers to number of observations. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  △Market-to-book ratio   △ROA   △ROE   △Accrual ratio 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
  Panel A. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from market model 
Intercept -0.116*** -0.137*** -0.142***   -1.241** -0.839** -0.884**   -0.850 -0.872 -0.821   -1.3** -1.411*** -1.459*** 
  (-5.756) (-6.886) (-7.234)   (-2.489) (-2.372) (-2.419)   (-1.52) (-1.492) (-1.374)   (-2.549) (-2.677) (-2.683) 
Returns 0.185 0.255** 0.152   -5.907** -4.248** -4.282**   -0.062 -3.697 -0.874   -0.111 -0.764 -0.177 
  (1.348) (2.19) (1.147)   (-1.744) (-2.047) (-1.733)   (-0.020) (-1.078) (-0.217)   (-0.032) (-0.247) (-0.048) 
N 609 574 554   606 571 551   599 564 544   604 569 547 
  Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from raw returns 
Intercept -0.117*** -0.14*** -0.144***   -1.155** -0.82** -0.851**   -0.807 -0.87 -0.84   -1.33*** -1.379*** -1.438*** 
  (-5.87) (-7.053) (-7.354)   (-2.337) (-2.303) (-2.322)   (-1.457) (-1.482) (-1.404)   (-2.634) (-2.608) (-2.642) 
Returns 0.257** 0.308*** 0.241**   -4.297 -2.897 -3.293   2.960 -1.611 2.256   -2.284 -2.183 -2.34 
  (1.922) (2.759) (1.878)   (-1.299) (-1.447) (-1.374)   (0.801) (-0.488) (0.577)   (-0.676) (-0.734) (-0.657) 
N 613 578 557   610 575 554   603 568 547   608 573 552 
  Panel C. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from Carhart four-factor model 
Intercept -0.116*** -0.137*** -0.142***   -1.219** -0.839** -0.885**   -0.860 -0.869 -0.822   -1.288** -1.414*** -1.458*** 
  (-5.729) (-6.888) (-7.231)   (-2.441) (-2.37) (-2.417)   (-1.537) (-1.487) (-1.377)   (-2.523) (-2.682) (-2.682) 
Returns 0.201 0.257** 0.176   -4.962 -4.229** -3.19   -0.485 -3.977 -1.431   0.375 -0.358 0.299 
  (1.449) (2.185) (1.299)   (-1.446) (-2.016) (-1.26)   (-0.125) (-1.148) (-0.346)   (0.107) (-0.115) (0.08) 
N 597 562 557   594 559 538   587 552 531   592 557 536 
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Table24 Impact of different returns on post-takeover performance, CARs calculated in three methods (successful sample) 
The change from pre-takeover ratio to post ratio is employed as dependent variable. Three kinds of returns are the major independent variables. Column (1) (4) (7) and (10) 
used return on acquirer stock as independent variables. Column (2), (5), (8) and (11) used return to institutional investors as independent variables. Column (3) (6) (9) and 
(12) used adjusted return to cross-ownership as independent variables. Returns are derived from (-5, +5). N refers to number of observations. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  △Market-to-book ratio   △ROA   △ROE   △Accrual ratio 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
    Panel A. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from market model 
Intercept -0.112*** -0.133*** -0.138***   -1.408** -0.856** -0.911**   -0.895 -0.864 -0.803   -1.353** -1.474** -1.52** 
  (-5.007) (-6.078) (-6.453)   (-2.438) (-2.084) (-2.152)   (-1.382) (-1.281) (-1.168)   (-2.294) (-2.433) (-2.439) 
Returns 0.12 0.259** 0.12   -5.988 -4.693** -4.851**   -0.038 -4.47 -1.524   0.555 -0.57 0.218 
  (0.79) (2.055) (0.835)   (-1.522) (-1.973) (-1.7)   (-0.009) (-1.145) (-0.329)   (0.138) (-0.162) (0.052) 
N 511 464 468   511 464 465   511 464 459   511 464 466 
    Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from raw returns 
Intercept -0.112*** -0.137*** -0.14***   -1.316** -0.828** -0.864**   -0.854 -0.851 -0.815   -1.394** -1.435** -1.499** 
  (-5.076) (-6.269) (-6.57)   (-2.301) (-2.003) (-2.036)   (-1.333) (-1.254) (-1.184)   (-2.389) (-2.359) (-2.403) 
Returns 0.213 0.33*** 0.231**   -4.267 -3.205 -3.726   3.158 -2.314 1.867   -2.174 -2.363 -2.469 
  (1.441) (2.699) (1.647)   (-1.116) (-1.383) (-1.339)   (0.737) (-0.609) (0.414)   (-0.557) (-0.693) (-0.603) 
N 515 464 471   515 464 468   515 464 462   515 464 469 
    Panel C. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from Carhart four-factor model 
Intercept -0.111*** -0.133*** -0.138***   -1.385** -0.854** -0.909**   -0.91 -0.86 -0.806   -1.339** -1.477** -1.518** 
  (-4.968) (-6.084) (-6.449)   (-2.395) (-2.079) (-2.144)   (-1.404) (-1.275) (-1.173)   (-2.269) (-2.437) (-2.436) 
Returns 0.151 0.263** 0.15   -4.969 -4.671** -3.628   -0.623 -4.78 -2.244   1.103 -0.133 0.727 
  (0.981) (2.069) (1.02)   (-1.246) (-1.953) (-1.242)   (-0.139) (-1.217) (-0.474)   (0.271) (-0.038) (0.169) 
N 505 464 462   505 464 459   505 464 453   505 464 460 
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Table25 Impact of different returns on post-takeover performance, CARs calculated in three methods (unsuccessful sample) 
The change from pre-takeover ratio to post ratio is employed as dependent variable. Three kinds of returns are the major independent variables. Column (1) (4) (7) and 
(10) used return on acquirer stock as independent variables. Column (2), (5), (8) and (11) used return to institutional investors as independent variables. Column (3) (6) 
(9) and (12) used adjusted return to cross-ownership as independent variables. Returns are derived from (-5, +5). N refers to number of observations. *Significant at 10%; 
**Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. T statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  △Market-to-book ratio   △ROA   △ROE   △Accrual ratio 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
    Panel A. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from market model 
Intercept -0.139*** -0.16*** -0.168***   -0.302 -0.758** -0.769**   -0.592 -0.945 -0.981   -1.011 -1.036 -1.061 
  (-3.06) (-3.38) (-3.387)   (-0.5) (-2.32) (-2.237)   (-0.86) (-1.37) (-1.348)   (-1.56) (-1.48) (-1.436) 
Returns 0.531* 0.226 0.36   -5.318 -1.113 -0.871   -0.15 1.779 3.19   -3.676 -2.194 -2.823 
  (1.74) (0.75) (1.064)   (-1.31) (-0.54) (-0.371)   (-0.03) (0.4) (0.642)   (-0.85) (-0.49) (-0.56) 
N 98 80 86   98 80 86   98 80 85   98 80 83 
    Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from raw returns 
Intercept -0.143*** -0.16*** -0.167***   -0.245 -0.759** -0.771**   -0.545 -0.956 -0.985   -0.97 -1.048 -1.076 
  (-3.15) (-3.36) (-3.36)   (-0.400) (-2.32) (-2.245)   (-0.79) (-1.39) (-1.36)   (-1.51) (-1.49) (-1.456) 
Returns 0.495 0.17 0.297   -4.079 -0.991 -0.804   1.952 2.673 4.483   -2.76 -0.995 -1.582 
  (1.62) (0.62) (0.932)   -0.999 (-0.53) (-0.364)   (0.42) (0.67) (0.963)   (-0.64) (-0.25) (-0.333) 
N 98 80 86   98 80 86   98 80 85   98 80 83 
    Panel C. Cumulative abnormal returns are derived from Carhart four-factor model 
Intercept -0.141*** -0.16*** -0.167***   -0.287 -0.762** -0.773**   -0.58 -0.947 -0.982   -1.006 -1.039 -1.066 
  (-3.08) (-3.37) (-3.376)   (-0.47) (-2.33) (-2.247)   (-0.84) (-1.37) (-1.352)   (-1.55) (-1.48) (-1.443) 
Returns 0.466 0.216 0.352   -4.794 -0.822 -0.522   0.304 2.238 3.736   -3.494 -2.132 -2.597 
  (1.51) (0.68) (1.008)   (-1.16) (-0.38) (-0.215)   (0.07) (0.48) (0.729)   (-0.8) (-0.45) (-0.498) 
N 92 80 79   92 80 79   92 80 78   92 80 76 
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Table 25 shows that the return effects on performance cannot be applied to the 
unsuccessful bidders’ performance. No significant relation can be observed in this table. 
In conclusion, only the returns of successful bidders will exert influence on their 
performance change, higher market-to-book ratio and lower ROA. 
 
7. Previous acquirers become targets in three years 
7.1 Empirical test 
Table 26 gives the influence of the CARs’ in six different event windows on the 
likelihood that acquirers themselves become public takeover target in following three 
years. The new takeover data is obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) 
merger databases. The CARs are the cumulative abnormal returns derived from market 
model, raw return and Cahart four-factor model in six different event window, (0,0), (-
5,1), (-1,+1), (-5,+5), (-5,+20), (-20,+20). Log (size) is the logarithmic value of bidders.  
There are 609 firms with CARs value available, 81 of which receive new takeover 
bid in the following three years and 87 new bids offered, since 6 firms get bids for two 
times.  
The results of the probability model are only positive and significant during event 
window (-1, +1). It means that the more excess returns the bidders gain during days (-
1, +1) around announcement day, the higher the possibility of the bidders becoming 
new takeover target in the future three years, Regardless of the models used to compute 
CARs. Nevertheless, this results are quite different from the statement made by 
Mitchell and Lehn (1990), who find that bidders doing badly in previous takeovers will 
become good target in the following bids. In their research, all the CARs in different 
event window, (0), (-5, +1), (-1, +1), (-5, +40) and (-20, +40), are adversely related with 
the probability of bidders becoming targets.  
This difference in results may be due to the different control variables, time period 
of data collection or industry effects. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) use 1158 public 
companies in 51 industries covered by Value Line during the fourth quarter of calendar  
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Table26 Logit estimates of probability that firms become target 
The probability that bidders become takeover targets themselves in three years after offering takeover 
bid is dependent variable. The cumulative abnormal returns in six event windows and the logarithm of 
bidders' size are designed to be independent variables. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; 




[0,0] [-5,1] [-1,+1] [-5,+5] [-5,+20] [-20,+20] 
  Panel A. CARs are derived from market model 
Intercept -1.147  -1.212  -1.251  -1.181  -1.150  -1.134  
  (0.308) (0.283) (0.260) (0.294) (0.31) (0.316) 
CARs 0.526  0.468  2.741** 0.311  -0.025  -0.102  
  (0.772) (0.619) (0.023) (0.705) (0.961) (0.802) 
Log(size) -0.034  -0.031  -0.027  -0.032  -0.034  -0.035  
  (0.522) (0.561) (0.604) (0.542) (0.520) (0.509) 
Model chi-square 0.496  0.655  5.630  0.555  0.414  0.473  
  Panel B. CARs are derived from acquirers' raw returns 
Intercept -1.158  -1.164  -1.214  -1.167  -1.125  -1.158  
  (0.303) (0.304) (0.276) (0.303) (0.323) (0.307) 
CARs 0.792  -0.197  2.200* -0.258  -0.267  -0.222  
  (0.661) (0.829) (0.060) (0.745) (0.597) (0.599) 
Log(size) -0.033  -0.034  -0.030  -0.034  -0.036  -0.034  
  (0.527) (0.523) (0.568) (0.524) (0.503) (0.522) 
Model chi-square 0.590  0.442  3.955  0.501  0.673  0.670  
  Panel C. CARs are derived from four-factor model 
Intercept -1.030  -1.053  -1.117  -0.973  -1.024  -0.981  
  (0.367) (0.359) (0.322) (0.401) (0.373) (0.396) 
CARs 0.542  0.167  2.244* -0.455  -0.110  -0.381  
  (0.767) (0.858) (0.056) (0.243) (0.894) (0.423) 
Log(size) -0.040  -0.039  -0.035  -0.045  -0.041  -0.044  
  (0.452) (0.465) (0.513) (0.411) (0.446) (0.419) 
Model chi-square 0.661  0.604  4.258  0.590  1.184  1.871  
 
year 1981, while the sample in this paper uses 660 public takeovers collected from 
Thomson Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) merger databases in 7300 industry from 1985 
to 2010. 
    To further study the impact of variables, the robustness test is added. 
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7.2 Robustness test 
In the previous section, Cross-Ownership And Takeover Returns, the returns on 
acquirer stock price are regressed on cross-holders' share in acquirers, relative size, 3-
year average market-to-book ratio, accrual ratio, presence of defense, existing of 
multiple bidder, horizontal takeover dummy, takeover status, and medium of exchange. 
In this section, using return to acquirer stock price as the major independent variable 
does not show satisfying results. Therefore, the error terms of the regression express 
the other information that is contained in CARs but cannot be explained by the control 
variables. In this section, this error terms serves as the new main variables in the 
regression procedure. The error term is derived from the regression model in table 17, 
column (2). This regression model uses the CARs in event widow (-5, +5). Therefore, 
the CARs during the other five windows are regressed using the same model in order 
to attain the other five error terms.  
The institutional shares, market share, leverage and logarithm of size are added as 
fundamental variables, which are the same as the model in the former section 
Institutional ownership’s effect on attracting a bidder.   
Since some of the firms receive new takeover bids more than once in the following 
three years, I collect the fundamental data for the next three years. Each firm has three 
observations, while each observation has the same error terms and previous takeover 
characteristics (such as presence of defense, existing of multiple bidder, horizontal 
takeover or not, takeover status and medium of exchange) but each observation has 
different fundamental data according to the corresponding year. In addition, the 
indicator year1 (or year2), a binary variable, is added to show that the observations are 
in the first (or second) year after the previous bid made. If the values of both variable 
year1 and variable year2 equal 0, it refers to the third year after the takeover. 
Table 27 gives the information of variables selected in the following regression 
model. The statistics of the error terms in each event window are shown in Panel A. 
Panel E gives the statistics of the characteristics in the previous bid. Among 609 
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takeovers with available data for CARs, 541 are failed, 99 make defense, 32 have more 
than one bidder, 446 are horizontal and 220 use only cash as the payment method. 
In Panel B, C and D, statistics for fundamental variables in the following 3 years 
are presented. Average institutional shares grow from 51.2% to 52.3% and firms’ 
average market share climbs up from 29.9% to 31.1%. The average market shares of 
these previous bidders are much larger than their target firms. Moreover, the leverage 
ratio also increases from 0.439 to 0.508, showing that bidders slightly increase 
liabilities after the bid is completed. The increase in the logarithm of market value can 
be explained by the consolidation of two firms.  
Table 28 shows the regression procedure results. Only the error terms derived from 
the market model CARs are shown in this table. The raw return and the Carhart four-
factor model are also used but are not presented because they generate similar results. 
Identically, only the error terms from event window (-1, +1) are positively associated 
with the probability of becoming target at 5% significant level. This result is consistent 
with those in the last part. Thus, the difference between the results in this paper and the 
findings of Mitchell and Lehn (1990) are not because of the difference in the variables 
employed, but probably because of the time effect and sample difference. And the 
factors to attract new bidders are not the same as the previous section regarding the 
characteristics of targets in 7300 industry. The industry effect is expected to affect the 
results, as this part focuses on the bidders in previous takeovers, and these bidders are 
not from the 7300 industry. 
Based on the conclusions drawn from in the previous section, the reason for the 
results in this robustness test could be that in the 7300 industry, higher excess return 
may come from lower cross-holders’ shares in acquirers, lower pre-takeover market-
to-book ratio, and cash payment (see table 15). These three factors can lead to lower 
premiums paid to other shareholders in targets without cross-ownership, lower share 
price afterwards, and no stock price volatility risk related to the previous target 
shareholders. According to these features, these firms with higher excess returns after 
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Table27 Statistical summary and indicator variables. 
The acquiring firms becoming target in later three years gives a value of 1 to the dependent variable 
in regression procedure. EMM refers to error terms in previous regression model. Error terms are 
derived from previous regressing (CARs on cross-ownership). Instown refers to the institutional 
ownership of the acquiring firms after bid in following three years respectively. Market share is 
specific firms' sales divided by total industry sales in the corresponding year. Leverage is the ratio of 
total liability to total assets. Log size stands for the logarithm of bidders' market value. Takeover status 
indicates whether the former takeover bids succeed or not. Defense is the presence of antitakeover 
measures used in former takeover. Multiple bidder is the indicator of whether multiple bidders exist in 
former takeover. Horizontal is the binary variable if acquiring firms also belong to 7300 industry. 
Medium indicates whether cash employed or not in former takeover bid.  
  Panel A. Variables 
  Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
EMM(0,0) -0.00019  0.065  0.005  -0.422  0.387  
EMM(-5,1) -0.00051  0.120  -0.002  -0.550  1.100  
EMM(-1,+1) -0.00049  0.097  -0.002  -0.609  0.547  
EMM(-20,+20) 0.00127  0.281  0.010  -1.823  1.699  
EMM(-5,+5) -0.00089  0.141  -0.003  -0.936  0.813  
EMM(-5,+20) 0.00055  0.227  0.007  -1.610  1.279  
  Panel B. Fundamental characteristics (year 1) 
Instown 0.512  0.300  0.561  2.046  0.000  
Market share 0.299  2.271  0.010  46.859  0.000  
Leverage 0.439  0.224  0.414  1.785  0.017  
Log(size) 20.865  20.689  2.274  27.377  13.979  
  Panel C. Fundamental characteristics (year 2) 
Instown 0.515  0.300  0.562  1.347  0.000  
Market share 0.309  2.082  0.016  40.043  0.000  
Leverage 0.491  0.249  0.458  1.761  0.044  
Log(size) 21.063  20.853  2.274  27.524  14.877  
  Panel D. Fundamental characteristics (year 3) 
Instown 0.523  0.302  0.575  1.147  0.000  
Market share 0.311  2.254  0.014  45.167  0.000  
Leverage 0.508  0.966  0.459  23.128  0.020  
Log(size) 21.193  20.892  2.332  27.149  14.790  
  Panel E. Indicator variables 
  Indicator=1 Percent of sample (%) Full sample   
Takeover Status 541 88.834  609   
Defense 99 16.256  609   
Multiple bidder 32 5.255  609   
Horizontal 446 73.235  609   
Medium 220 36.125  609   
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Table 28 Logit estimates of probability that firms become target 
The acquiring firms becoming target in later three years gives a value of 1 to the dependent variable in 
regression procedure. Error terms are derived from previous regressing (market model CARs on cross-
ownership). Instown refers to the institutional ownership of the acquiring firms after bid in following 
three years respectively. Market share is specific firms' sales divided by total industry sales in the 
corresponding year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability to total assets. Log size stands for the logarithm 
of bidders' market value. Takeover status indicates whether the former takeover bids succeed or not. 
Defense is the presence of antitakeover measures used in former takeover. Multiple bidder is the indicator 
of whether multiple bidders exist in former takeover. Horizontal is the binary variable if acquiring firms 
also belong to 7300 industry. Medium indicates whether cash employed or not in former takeover bid. 
Year 1 is the indicator with a value of 1 if the independent variables are from the first year after bid, 
while year 2 indicates the second year after bid. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant 




[0,0] [-5,1] [-1,+1] [-5,+5] [-5,+20] [-20,+20] 
Intercept -4.261** -4.442** -4.511** -4.188** -4.329** -4.275** 
  (5.524) (6.093) (6.447) (5.26) (5.755) (5.485) 
Error terms 0.143 1.247 3.57** -0.268 0.605 0.057 
  (0.003) (0.996) (4.353) (0.255) (0.271) (0.007) 
Instown -0.468 -0.449 -0.465 -0.456 -0.466 -0.467 
  (0.548) (0.505) (0.542) (0.522) (0.547) (0.548) 
Market share -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.314 0.303 0.278 0.318 0.308 0.314 
  (1.021) (0.989) (0.834) (0.913) (1.051) (1.031) 
Log(size) 0.068 0.075 0.079 0.065 0.071 0.069 
  (0.713) (0.887) (0.998) (0.629) (0.784) (0.716) 
Takeover status -0.412 -0.404 -0.43 -0.41 -0.412 -0.412 
  (0.906) (0.868) (0.978) (0.899) (0.906) (0.905) 
Defense -0.039 -0.035 -0.035 -0.041 -0.036 -0.04 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Multiple bidder -0.698 -0.669 -0.679 -0.696 -0.686 -0.698 
  (0.44) (0.404) (0.417) (0.438) (0.425) (0.44) 
Horizontal 0.046 0.062 0.088 0.036 0.054 0.047 
  (0.015) (0.027) (0.053) (0.009) (0.02) (0.015) 
Medium -0.667 -0.675 -0.647 -0.661 -0.669 -0.668 
  (2.323) (2.383) (2.196) (2.281) (2.341) (2.327) 
Year1 -0.133 -0.131 -0.136 -0.135 -0.133 -0.133 
  (0.124) (0.12) (0.129) (0.126) (0.124) (0.124) 
Year2 -0.614 -0.61 -0.612 -0.613 -0.614 -0.614 
  (1.912) (1.886) (1.897) (1.906) (1.916) (1.913) 
Model chi-square 14.9  15.8  19.0  15.1  15.1  14.9  
The impact of institutional investors’ cross-ownership in takeover process 
- 70 - 
 
the takeover activities are expected to be undervalued, which is attractive for new 
bidders. 
However, these expectation may not be generally applicable, and can only be 
applied to firms in the 7300 industry during 1985- 2010 time period. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the institutional effect on the entire takeover process in the 
7300 industry, which includes the probability of attracting a takeover bid, the success 
of the bid, the offer price, the stock price premiums, the characteristics affecting the 
premiums, the post-bid performance, and the possibility of previous bidders becoming 
new targets. Some of the results are consistent with previous studies, while some are 
new findings of this paper. 
  Firms from different industry sectors vary in their consideration when selecting 
target firms from 7300 industry. For the firms in Business Service Industry, the factors 
distinguishing whether an acquirer is from the 7300 industry sector are the fraction of 
intangible assets to total assets, market share and leverage. More importantly, the more 
institutional shares held in a firm, the more likely that the firm receives a takeover bid, 
and this bid is more likely to be accepted by the firm. These results prove the former 
conclusion that institutions can monitor the investee and remove value-damaging anti-
takeover defenses. 
  Next, the bidders with lower level of cross-ownership are more likely to acquire 
the targets successfully. . This result is consistent with the hypothesis 2 that the negative 
relationship between the probability of takeover success and toehold size can be applied 
to the probability of takeover success and cross-ownership as well. The previous studies 
about the toeholds show that holding a proportion of toehold can lead to winning in 
auction, but there’s an optimal toehold size. According to the findings of Bris (2001), 
some acquirers secretly buy toehold before takeover, which may drive up the targets’ 
share price and give rise to the failure of the final takeover. In addition, lower average 
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market-to-book ratio before takeover bid also increases the possibility of success. 
 When considering the offer price for the transaction, the institutional investors’ 
cross-ownerships in acquirers and targets before takeover are important and have 
inverse influence. The increase in ownership in target firms reduces the probability of 
success as well as the offer price. The institutional investors are more likely to be good 
monitors and to remove value-reducing takeover resistance when they have higher 
ownership in the target firms. In addition, the institutional shares that are not cross-
owned also negatively affect the offer price. The hostile bids with the presence of 
takeover defenses significantly pull up the offer price. 
 Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) and Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989) have confirmed that target firms benefit a lot from the takeover 
activities, while acquirers lose a lot. This paper obtains the same results for the 
takeovers in the 7300 industry. Furthermore, when the full sample is divided into two 
subsamples of successful takeovers and unsuccessful bids, we can find that the loss of 
bidders are almost at the same level in each sample, while the targets in the successful 
sample perform much better than the ones in the unsuccessful sample. These results 
arrive at the conclusion that although on average all target firms achieve positive returns 
around takeover bid announcement, the target firms finally accepting the bid will gain 
more positive premiums. 
  The gains of institutional investors and cross-holders are also obtained. These 
results are consistent with the previous conclusion made by Matvos and Ostrovsky 
(2008) that even if acquirers lose a lot in takeovers, the premiums of cross-holders who 
own shares in targets will not be significantly negative, as the loss of acquirer stock 
price can be offset by the gains in targets stock price. When the takeover data in the 
7300 industry is used to calculate the results, I find that acquirers in general lose 
dramatically, but institutional acquirers and cross-owners’ shares in acquirers are 
insignificant and positive. The difference between the excess returns of total acquirers 
and cross-holders is also significant. When the sample is divided into two subsamples 
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of successful takeover and unsuccessful takeovers, same results are displayed. 
The performance of bidders and targets are also discussed in this paper. In general, 
bidding firms suffer from a decrease in performance, especially when measured by 
market-to-ratio, after the bid. This conclusion applies in all samples. The acquired firms 
that turn down the bid will suffer from a poor performance in the next three years. This 
bad performance can be explained as that the target firms refused new technology, 
higher market power, better management and improved competiveness when they turn 
down the bid. In addition, the return to cross-holders and institutional investors will 
positively affect the change of market-to-book ratio due to synergy. 
Last but not least, on the contrary to Mitchell and Lehn’s (1990) finding, I find only 
the excess return during (-1, +1) event window is positively correlated with the 
probability that pervious bidders become new targets in the following three years. I also 
add the robustness test, in which excess returns are replaced by regression independent 
variables and error terms (excess returns as dependent variable) from previous 
regressions. Similar results are obtained from the robustness test. However, the 
difference in the results may be due to different observations in the sample and the 
difference of time period. 
According to the previous studies, Bris (2001) and Betton and Eckbo (2000) find that 
acquiring toehold before making takeover bid may be observed by the market and affect 
the run-up period before announcement day. Nevertheless, if the institution investors in 
acquiring firms grasp the inside information for future takeover, they are convenient to 
buy the future target’s share in public market, without attracting special attention from 
the public, as they are shareholders of so many securities.  
In this research, certain limitations still exist. This paper studies only the firms in the 
7300 industry, and includes only  public takeovers in U.S. market in the full sample. 
If possible, the whole industry firms should be included into the sample in order to 
obtain more accurate results. 
When collecting institutional ownership data for the full sample, up to half of the 
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observations are dropped because of the lack of institutional data in the database. To 
improve the accurateness of this research, hand-collection would be better to obtain 
data from every fund’s quarterly report. 
In addition, the individual shareholders that are not institutional shareholders can 
also hold the shares in target firms if they invest in the public capital market. Similarly, 
the institutional holders in bidding firms that do not report holding shares in targets, 
possibly have the shares of another fund or portfolio which includes the security of 
target firms. Moreover, even if institutions don’t possess any stock in the targets, they 
could be, for example, the bond holders of the targets, which can affect the takeover 
probability as well. This kind of effect has not been taken into account in this paper. 
Goldman and Qian (2005) find out the optimal toehold size to obtain maximum 
premiums in takeover. Similarly, future studies can focus on the takeovers in the 7300 
industry to find the optimal number of shares held by cross-holders in acquiring firms 
and target firms before offering the takeover bid, which can maximize the cross-holders’ 
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Table29 The shares held by cross-holders and returns to stockholders in Microsoft and Yahoo case 
Panel A shows 10 largest cross-owners' share in target and bidder. Panel B is the dollar return in million 
to 10 largest cross-shareholders' ownership in target and bidder. Panel C gives the data of return to target 
and bidder in percentage and dollar. Return is calculated by market model. 
Panel A. 10 largest cross-shareholders' ownership in target and bidder 
10 largest cross-shareholders  Ownership in Yahoo Ownership in Microsoft 
Barclays 3.731% 3.114% 
Capital research 2.561% 6.368% 
Capital world 3.037% 5.211% 
Axa 1.248% 0.455% 
Fidelity 1.692% 1.357% 
Franklin 1.213% 0.139% 
Mellon 1.303% 1.390% 
T. Rowe 1.460% 1.706% 
State 2.895% 2.783% 
Vanguard 2.564% 2.793% 
Total 21.704% 25.316% 
Panel B. Dollar return to 10 largest cross-shareholders' ownership in target and bidder (mil) 
10 largest cross-shareholders  Yahoo return Microsoft return 
Barclays 399.63  -1706.82  
Capital research 274.29  -3490.81  
Capital world 325.28  -2856.73  
Axa 133.66  -249.44  
Fidelity 181.29  -743.79  
Franklin 129.97  -76.18  
Mellon 139.58  -761.73  
T. Rowe 156.34  -935.35  
State 310.12  -1525.31  
Vanguard 274.70  -1531.19  
Total 2324.84  -13877.34  
Panel C. Return to target and bidder (mil) 
  Yahoo Microsoft 
Return (-5,+5) 36.933% -17.714% 
Dollar return 10711.72  -54817.23  
10 largest cross-holders' dollar return 2324.84  -13877.34  
Total cross-holders' dollar return 5302.871032 -37449.8078 
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Aktas, Bodt and Roll (2013) give the case that on February 1, 2008, Microsoft offered a price of 
43.7 billion U.S. dollars to acquire Yahoo, but this bid failed at last and Microsoft suffered a heavy loss.  
In my research, another aspect of this case will be analyzed. Table 29 shows the cross-ownership in 
two firms reported on the last report day. Data is from Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional 
(13f) Holdings database and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We can find in Panel A that 
the largest 10 cross-owners make up 21.707% of Yahoo’s shares and 25.316% of Microsoft shares before 
takeover announcement. Around the announcement day, from -5 to +5, Yahoo achieves 36.933% excess 
return and 11dollar return, while Microsoft suffers the loss of -17.714% excess return and -37 billion 
dollar. For the stockholders in Microsoft as a whole, they really lost a lot in this takeover bid. However, 
when we only focus on the cross-stockholders, who also own the shares in Yahoo, the result may be a 
little different. 
In Panel C, the 10 largest cross-holders lose -13.88 billion dollars in Microsoft, but this loss is 
partially offset by the gains of 2.324 billion dollars in Yahoo. For these cross-owners, their rate of return 
is calculated as (2.324+ (-13.88)) / (29.003×21.707% + 309.457×25.316%) = -13.653%, which is much 
better than the total loss of -17.714%. 
Similarly, if we turn to the total cross-holders, we can find that they suffer a loss of -37.449 billion 
dollar in Microsoft, but gain 5.303 billion dollars from Yahoo’s share. Therefore, the return for the total 
cross-holders can be computed as (-37.449 + 5.303) / (29.003 × 68.318% + 309.457×49.505%) =       
-14.248%, also better than -17.714%.  
In this case, Aktas, Bodt and Roll (2013) attribute the overbidding to agency problems or manager 
hubris. No matter which holds,  firm value will be destroyed and shareholders’ wealth will decline. 
However, the institutional investors will not worry so much as they already own a little part of target 
firms’ share, which will earn positive premium in the takeover and compensate the loss. This case 
supports the idea of Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008). 
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Table30 Number of firms in each year of nine largest industries 
Number of firms exist in each year from 1985 to 2010. 1000 stands for Metal Mining industry. 1300 
refers to Oil And Gas Extraction industry. 2800 represents for Chemicals And Allied Products industry.  
3500 is for Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment industry. 3600 stands for 
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment industry. 
3800 includes Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And 
Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks industry. 4900 refers to Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 
industry. 6000 defines as Depository Institutions industry. 7300 is Business Service industry. 
SIC 1000 1300 2800 3500 3600 3800 4900 6000 7300 
1985 130 400 315 419 399 360 428 463 390 
1986 182 453 407 517 515 459 444 559 546 
1987 187 436 441 527 528 467 453 645 568 
1988 190 434 449 522 515 471 459 690 572 
1989 190 427 464 506 519 465 454 709 581 
1990 180 419 500 501 533 473 454 728 613 
1991 177 424 545 525 547 504 460 740 703 
1992 180 438 593 546 568 531 458 811 800 
1993 177 458 627 566 612 549 457 1006 911 
1994 195 467 643 580 655 551 460 963 1046 
1995 211 471 709 601 711 600 459 906 1251 
1996 212 465 736 604 736 595 461 858 1380 
1997 200 444 735 584 736 585 445 801 1471 
1998 201 452 788 585 757 591 433 836 1614 
1999 227 461 820 547 749 583 436 928 1628 
2000 258 467 830 517 720 550 413 917 1527 
2001 272 449 850 476 681 529 417 912 1387 
2002 295 445 841 457 666 521 414 898 1279 
2003 340 469 849 430 648 513 417 915 1172 
2004 391 499 873 412 665 509 416 869 1134 
2005 442 518 872 383 664 493 418 848 1103 
2006 516 539 877 363 655 474 422 805 1048 
2007 529 527 852 350 640 447 406 759 995 
2008 553 530 805 330 617 412 400 733 937 
2009 602 523 792 321 588 390 397 725 907 
2010 670 559 794 309 557 378 389 721 920 
2011 126 34 50 41 97 40 10 16 112 
Sum 7833 12208 18057 12519 16278 13040 11280 20761 26595 
 
